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In response to a perceived decline in the global threat and reduced defense
budgets, the Navy has sought to reduce costs and increase efficiency through the concept
of regionalization, i.e., the consolidation of support functions for all activities in a specific
geographic area. The primary means of cost reduction under regionalization is the
elimination of military and civilian manpower requirements through the elimination of
management functions on individual bases. The regionalization concept is currently in
various stages of implementation throughout the world, and uses as its basis the concept
of ccbest business practices." A comprehensive means to evaluate the effectiveness of
regionalization has not been established; therefore there is no accepted basis upon which
to judge the financial benefits of regionalization, the associated financial and readiness
costs, or the best approach to implementation. This thesis synthesizes best business
practices and ongoing regionalization efforts at the Pacific Northwest, Pacific Southwest,
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This thesis will identify criteria to be used in the evaluation ofNavy regionalization
efforts using best business practices. These criteria may be applied when considering
effectiveness of regional support and modifications to regional business concepts.
Research consisted of: (1) a review of regionalization history, (2) a review of
regionalization efforts in the Pacific Northwest, Pacific Southwest, and Hawaii regions,
(3) comparing and contrasting these efforts, (4) a review of current best business practice
literature, and (5) synthesis of literature and application of theory to establish criteria to
evaluate regionalization in the Navy.
B. BACKGROUND
The Navy has sought to reduce costs and increase efficiency through the concept
of regionalization, i.e., the consolidation of support functions for all activities in a specific
geographic area. The regionalization concept is currently at various stages of
implementation throughout the world.
A comprehensive means to evaluate the effectiveness of regionalization has not
been established; therefore there is no accepted basis upon which to judge the financial
benefits of regionalization, the associated financial and readiness costs, or the best
approach to implementation. This thesis will synthesize best business practices and
ongoing regionalization efforts at three Pacific sites to establish criteria for evaluation of
regionalization.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What criteria should be used to evaluate regionalization efforts in the Navy?
2. Secondary Research Questions
(a) What regionalization concepts have been applied in creating the three Pacific
regions?
(b) What measurement tools and data are available to evaluate the fiscal impacts of
these efforts?
(c) Which of these tools can be effectively applied to Navy activities?
(d) What further research will be necessary to apply these tools and evaluate Navy
regionalization?
D. SCOPE
This thesis will compare and contrast regionalization efforts at the three Pacific
regions and establish criteria for evaluation of regionalization using principles derived from
analysis of contemporary best business practices. It will include (1) a review of
regionalization concepts, (2) review of three regionalization cases, (3) review and
application of best business practices to regionalization, and (4) establishment of
evaluation criteria for regionalization. The thesis will not provide a cost benefit analysis of
regionalization in the three cases, as implementation is not complete. However, topics for
future research in that area will be identified.
E. METHODOLOGY
The methodology utilized for this research is divided into six steps: (1) review of
the pertinent literature, (2) collection of data, (3) interviews with affected activities, (4)
summarization of regionalization efforts, (5) synthesis of literature to regionalization
goals, and (6) establishment of criteria to evaluate consequences of regionalization.
(1) Literature: A review ofthe literature on current best business practices was conducted.
The literature was used to choose the most appropriate models to evaluate regionalization
consequences.
(2) Data: Data were collected from the three regionalization sites. These data included
organizational structures, standards of service, manpower and cost data, and local lessons
learned.
(3) Interviews: Personnel responsible for regionalization were interviewed, as were
personnel from commands affected by regionalization.
(4) Summarization of efforts: Information obtained in (2) and (3) above has been
compared and contrasted to describe the status of regionalization and the resulting
organizational structures.
(5) Synthesis of literature: Currently accepted better business concepts are compared to
stated regionalization goals and current regionalization methods and results.
(6) Establishment of Criteria: Criteria for evaluation of current and future Navy
regionalization efforts have been developed.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II provides the background for regionalization and describes
regionalization concepts and guidance within the framework of the overall Navy
infrastructure reduction effort. This chapter describes Navy goals and methods for
regionalization.
Chapter III describes regionalization at three Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific
Fleet (CINCPACFLT) regions and compares and contrasts the three approaches to
regionalization. It also identifies unique characteristics of the three sites in terms of
mission and geography.
Chapter IV examines problems and issues encountered at the sites. This chapter
discusses difficulties encountered in regionalization and addresses concerns of units that
comprise the regional customer base. It is not intended to be an evaluation of
regionalization efforts, but sets the stage for development of criteria for analysis by
identifying customer expectations and perceptions and by discussing resistance to
regionalization efforts.
Chapter V discusses the results of the analysis. The contents will include
presentation, analysis, and discussion of criteria for evaluation of Navy regionalization.
This chapter provides a synthesis of literature and the application of theory to
regionalization.
Chapter VI provides conclusions, lessons learned, recommendations, and
identification of areas for future research.
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
Regionalization of functions within geographic regions has broad fiscal, readiness,
and quality of life implications for the organizations served by the resulting support
activities. To date no criteria have been established to determine the financial and
efficiency costs and benefits of such sweeping changes. By identifying these criteria, based
4
on current business practices, this research will help guide future evaluation and
adjustment of regionalization efforts. The results of this evaluation will lend additional
validity to the regionalization concept and identify shortcomings with the current
regionalization concept or application. It may also serve to improve ongoing
regionalization efforts by identifying specific issues to be considered in implementation,





The idea of sharing Navy infrastructures and capabilities within a geographic area
as a means of achieving efficiency is not new. The Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) initiated seminal "regionalization" efforts in developing partnerships with
Naval Aviation Depots nearly a decade ago. The success of these and other partnerships
led to the consideration of regionalization on a wider scale. It became apparent that the
Navy could no longer support an infrastructure that relied upon dedicated, specialized,
stand-alone organizations for different support functions located in the same geographic
area. Moreover, corporate America was achieving huge savings by reengineering and
reorganizing corporate structures, and the Navy leadership wished to duplicate some of
these successes. In June 1997, Admiral Jay Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations,
ordered the Navy to move forward and regionalize the infrastructure.
B. REGIONALIZATION OVERVIEW
1. Regionalization guidance
The regionalization directive was brief. Indeed, it is succinct enough to be
duplicated in its entirety below [Ref. 6]:
******PERSONAL FOR******
P232110ZJUN97
FM: CNO WASHINGTON DC ORIG NOO
Subject: REGIONALIZATION//
UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR COMMANDERS. COMMANDING OFFICERS. AND
OFFICERS IN CHARGE //NO4000// NAVOP 004/97
MSGID/GENADMfN/CNO NOO//
SUBJ/REGIONALIZATION//
RMKS/1. AS WE GO FORWARD. ONE OF OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES MUST
BE TO REDUCE THE COST OF OPERATING THE NAVY SHORE
ESTABLISHMENT SO WE CAN USE THOSE SAVINGS FOR PEOPLE/QUALITY
OF LIFE. READINESS. AND MODERNIZATION. THIS INITIATIVE BEGAN WITH
OUR REGIONAL MAINTENANCE CONCEPT OF TWO YEARS AGO WE'RE JUST
STARTING TO SEE THOSE EFFORTS COME TO FRUITION, AND IT'S TIME
NOW TO AGGRESSrVELY AND COLLECTIVELY WORK TOGETHER ON
OVERALL REGIONALIZATION. THE SAVINGS FROM REDUCED
INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PLAN FOR THE
FY99 BUDGET, AND SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF THE PLAN WILL BE
DEPENDENT ON THIS INITIATIVE.
2. WE HAVE MUCH TO DO AND OUR APPROACH TO INFRASTRUCTURE COST
REDUCTION SHOULD CENTER ON TWO FUNDAMENTALS:
A REGIONALIZING INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT (IM) FUNCTIONS IN
SHORE CONCENTRATION AREAS: BY SO DOING, WE WOULD ELIMINATE
REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS/ORGANIZATIONS AND STREAMLINE REMAINING
FUNCTIONS THROUGH STANDARDIZATION. CONSOLIDATION, AND
ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY OVERHEAD COSTS. ALSO. WE COULD
IDENTIFY THOSE REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO MISSION
SUCCESS AND MEET THOSE REQUIREMENTS THROUGH OPTIONS THAT
RESULT IN BEST VALUE FOR NAVY. IN IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES TO
REGIONALIZE, WE MUST TAKE A BROAD VIEW OF IM, INCLUDING SUCH
FUNCTIONS AS AIR OPERATIONS. PORT SERVICES AND ADP, IN ADDITION
TO BASE OPERATING SUPPORT (BOS) SERVICES SUCH AS REAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, BACHELOR QUARTERS, AND SECURITY.
B. REDUCING THE NUMBER OF CLAIMANTS IN THE. IM BUSINESS:
CLAIMANT CONSOLIDATION WOULD ALLOW SMALLER CLAIMANTS TO
FOCUS ON THEIR PRIMARY MISSION WHILE LARGER CLAIMANTS,
INCLUDING THE FLEETS, WOULD PROVIDE EM SERVICES TO TENANT
ACTIVITIES WITHIN A REGION. INSTALLATION CLAIMANT
CONSOLIDATION WOULD FACILITATE REGIONALIZATION AND REDUCE
ECHELON ONE AND TWO IM STAFFS. SUCH REALIGNMENTS WOULD ALSO
ALLOW THE REMAINING CLAIMANT SERVICE PROVIDERS TO BE MORE
COMPETITIVE AS WE EXPLORE OUTSOURCING AND PRIVATIZATION
OPTIONS.
3. THERE IS NO SINGLE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE TOTAL
COST SAVINGS NEEDED TO SUPPORT OUR FORCE STRUCTURE. MANY
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS LIE OUTSIDE OUR PURVIEW. WE CAN ACHIEVE
NEEDED SAVINGS ONLY THROUGH REGIONALLY FOCUSED ANALYSES
DEVELOPED THROUGH THE ACTIVE AND COLLABORATIVE PARTICIPATION
OF REGIONAL COMMANDERS. LOCAL COMMANDING OFFICERS. LEAD
FLEET/MAJOR CLAIMANTS AND OPNAV. AS THE RESULT OF ONE SUCH
EFFORT. CINCPACFLT AND COMNAVBASE SAN DIEGO ARE NOW
IMPLEMENTING EM REGIONALIZATION IN SAN DIEGO CINCLANTFLT.
CINCPACFLT AND CNET REGIONALIZATION ANALYSES ARE ALSO
ONGOING AT OTHER LOCATIONS. SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL SAVINGS ARE
BEING IDENTIFIED PARTICULARLY WHEN BOS SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE
CONSOLIDATED.
4. OUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR REGIONALIZATION ARE CLEAR:
- NO TENANT SHOULD DO WHAT A HOST COMMAND CAN DO.
- NO HOST SHOULD DO WHAT A REGIONAL COMPLEX CAN DO.
- NO REGIONAL COMPLEX SHOULD DO WHAT THE SURROUNDING
COMMUNITY CAN DO MORE COST EFFECTIVELY.
- THE NUMBER OF HOST COMMANDS AND TENANTS PROVIDING SERVICES
SHOULD BE REDUCED TO THE MINIMUM.
5. INITIATIVES TO REDUCE INFRASTRUCTURE ARE SENSITIVE ISSUES BOTH
HERE PN WASHINGTON AND PN LOCAL COMMUNITIES. THUS IT IS
PMPORTANT THAT WE CAREFULLY ARTICULATE THESE CONCEPTS. WE
MUST BE CAREFUL TO ENSURE THAT A CLEAR DISTPNCTION IS MADE
BETWEEN "LOOKPNG AT/STUDYTNG/ANALYZPNG" A PARTICULAR PM
FUNCTION, AND 'TiXECUTPNG/REALIGNING/RESTRUCTURPNG".
CONFLICTPNG PNFORMATION PROVIDED AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF THE
CHAIN OF COMMAND CAUSES SERIOUS CONFUSION AND MAY DELAY
IMPLEMENTING THE PNITIATTVES SUPPORTED BY OUR ANALYSIS. ALL
LEVELS OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND SHOULD BE SUPPORTING THESE
EFFORTS FOR ALL THE SAME REASONS. AND GUIDANCE MUST BE CLEAR
AND PROPERLY COORDPNATED. AT THE SAME TIME, SENIOR LEADERS
WTTfflN EACH REGION MUST ENSURE THAT PPJNCIPALS WITHPN THE
LOCAL COMMUNITIES ARE PNFORMED AND PNVOLVED PN CREATING A
MORE COST EFFECTIVE PNFRASTRUCTURE. IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD
THAT THERE IS STRENGTH PN REGIONALIZATION. THE MORE EFFICIENT
AREAS ARE, THE MORE SOLID THEIR FOUNDATION.
6. WE MUST BUILD UPON THE SUCCESSES OF OTHER REGIONAL EFFORTS
SUCH AS PN MAPNTENANCE AND FISC PARTNERPNG. HOWEVER,
THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS. WE MUST CONSIDER THE EFFECTS OF
REGIONALIZATION PNITIATIVES ON HOMEBASPNG, SEA/SHORE ROTATION
AND OTHER PROGRAMS CRITICAL TO THE RETENTION OF OUR HIGHLY
TRAPNED AND SKILLED PERSONNEL, ENSURING THAT OUR EFFORTS DO
NOT RESULT PN OUR SAILORS OR CIVILIANS BEPNG ASKED TO DO MORE
WTIH LESS. I ASK FOR THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT OF ALL
COMMANDS AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO REALIGN SHORE
PNFRASTRUCTURE WHERE IT MAKES SENSE. YOUR ACTIVE SUPPORT AND
BEST EFFORTS WILL BE CRITICAL TO OUR SUCCESS.
7. RELEASED BY ADMIRAL JAY L. JOHNSON, CNO//
This brief order directs fundamental changes in Navy waterfront infrastructure.
The message provides goals, guiding principles, and broad means of implementation.
Strong emphasis is placed on eliminating duplication of effort and waste, and the four
guiding principles would become mantras to all of the regions surveyed: no tenant should
do what a host command can do; no host should do what a regional complex can do; no
regional complex should do what the surrounding community can do more cost
effectively; the number of host commands and tenants providing services should be
reduced to the minimum [Ref. 6]. The potential of regionalization as one of many possible
tools to increase efficiency, thereby reducing costs, is the central feature of the message.
Importantly, it also provides a strong caution against reducing the infrastructure at the
expense of readiness and quality of life of sailors and civilian employees.
The logical sequence of events implied by this document is Installation Claimant
Consolidation, followed by Regionalization/Reengineering. In fact, in a subsequent
message, the CNO stated that, "...regionalization and installation claimant consolidation
are inextricably linked" [Ref. 7]. When the Most Efficient Organization (MEO) is reached,
then competitive outsourcing studies would be performed in accordance with OMB
Circular A-76. The regionalized activities, configured in the MEO, would be better able
to compete with commercial activities in outsourcing studies. This process is summarized
in Figure 2-1.
2. Installation Claimant Consolidation
As the first step to regionalization, Installation Claimant Consolidation was
intended to relieve smaller claimants of their Installation Management (Dvl)
responsibilities, allowing them to focus on operational mission areas. The number of
Claimants Navy-wide with Base Operation Support (BOS) as a primary mission would be
reduced from eighteen to eight. Navy activities were categorized as being within Navy









Fig. 2-1, Chronological Regionalization Approach
Concentration areas are CINCPACFLT for San Diego, Port Hueneme, Pacific Northwest,
Hawaii, Guam, Japan, and Korea; Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(CINCLANTFLT) for Hampton Roads, Jacksonville, New England and Charleston; Chief
of Naval Education and Training (CNET) for Pensacola, Great Lakes, and South Texas,
CNO for Greater Washington DC and Bahrain; Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces,
Europe (CENCUSNAVEUR) for all installations in Europe; and Chief, Navy Reserve
Forces (CHNAVRES) for New Orleans. The two additional BOS claimants are Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) for BOS functions integral to industrial operations
and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) for research and development funded
functions at PT Mugu and NAVAIR stand-alone warfare centers [Ref. 7].
Consolidation of installation management staffs would result in manpower savings.
More importantly, in theory the larger consolidated claimants would have greater
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flexibility in budget execution and would realize the advantages associated with a deeper
pool of IM expertise and economies of scale. NAVOP 015/97, the CNO message
announcing claimant consolidation, required consolidation to be complete by 01 October
1998 [Ref. 7]. Consolidation involved a budget base transfer ofBOS funding, the transfer
of civilian end-strength and military billets, and the transfer of Class I (Land) and Class II
(Buildings, Structures) property, to the remaining eight claimants. Both new and existing
tenant activities were then required to review and/or establish host/tenant agreements with
the consolidated BOS providing claimants.
3. Further Regionalization Guidance
The CNO regionalization message allowed Fleet Commanders broad discretion in
the implementation of regionalization; indeed, no definitive or comprehensive model of
what constituted base support and what functions were to be regionalized existed
The Installation Management Accounting Project (EV1AP) team, operating under a
charter signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and
Comptroller (ASN, FM&C) and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO),
Logistics, developed the Installation Core Business Model [Ref. 23]. The purpose of the
model was to provide more consistent and accurate financial accounting. The model
defined business areas, functions, and subfunctions funded with Base Operating Support
(BOS) budgets, with the intent of improving cost accounting procedures by providing a
consistent basis for reporting BOS expenditures to the Standard Accounting & Reporting
System, Field Level (STARS/FL), the Navy's accounting system. The regions studied
have adopted this model, to varying degrees, as a baseline to describe those functions that
12
should be provided by a regional commander. The model is summarized in Figure 2-2.
In an effort to further define those functions that a regional claimant should
provide to tenants, CINCPACFLT developed a Common Service Support table for Navy
Support Agreements. The guidance was designed to standardize terminology consistent
with the Installation Core Business Model. This model has been proposed by OPNAV
N46 (Shore Installation Management) as a services baseline to be used in implementing
regionalization by other claimants [Ref. 55].
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Fig. 2-2, Installation Core Business Model, [Ref. 23]
Further amplifying guidance was provided by the DCNO, Logistics on 22
13
December 1 998 in the form of the Navy Infrastructure Reduction Business Plan. This
document reiterated goals and strategies of Infrastructure Reduction and provided a plan
for the absorption of an $8 billion dollar total reduction in funding from fiscal years 1998
through 2005, which has come to be known as "the wedge." Although the document
addressed the role of regionalization in infrastructure reduction, its primary focus is on
competitive sourcing as a means to liquidate "the wedge." OMB Circular A-76 directed
competitive sourcing of functions to private sector business, and it is viewed by the Navy
as the "primary vehicle for infrastructure reduction" [Ref. 54].
4. Competitive Sourcing
An exhaustive study of competitive sourcing initiatives is clearly beyond the scope
of this thesis. However, many Navy military personnel and civilian employees not directly
involved in regionalization implementation view the two initiatives as one and the same. It
is true, in fact, that both may be used as means to the same end, reduced cost through
reduced infrastructure. They are separate processes, but the success of regionalization has
implications for the outcome of future "A-76" studies, and attempts to outsource and
regionalize simultaneously have possible impacts on customer support. For these reasons
competitive sourcing is now discussed.
OMB Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities, was first issued in
1966 and revised in 1967, 1979, and 1983. It established as federal policy the idea that,
"...In the process of governing, the Government should not compete with its citizens.
The competitive enterprise system, characterized by individual freedom and initiative, is
the primary source of national economic strength. In recognition of this principle, it has
14
been and continues to be the general policy of the Government to rely on commercial
sources to supply the products and services the Government needs" [Ref. 53]. The
handbook accompanying the Circular was revised in 1996 and provides detailed
methodology for determining which activities are not inherently governmental and how to
determine the best source for those services. The Navy Outsourcing Support Office
provided supplemental guidance in Succeeding at Competition; A Guide to Conducting
Commercial Activities Studies [Ref. 45]. This publication organizes the A-76 study










DESCRIPTION OF STEPS ON THE A-76 TIMELINE
Plan for Commercial Activities Study Step 9: Perform Independent Review
Develop PWS and QASP Step 10: Evaluate Proposals
Review and Revise PWS and QASP Step 1 1 : Obtain Prenegotiation Clearance
Approval
Obtain High Level Approval of PWS and Step 12: Conduct Discussions with Offerors
Conduct Presolicitatoon Actions
Prepare and Issue Solicitation
Develop the Management Plan
Respond to Solicitation
Step 13: Obtain Final Clearance Approval for
Selecting Best Value Contractor Proposal
Step 14: Compare Government and Contractor
Proposals
Step 15: Announce Tentative Decision
Fig. 2-3, Steps ofSucceeding at Competition, [Ref. 45]
Regardless of the success of other Navy infrastructure reduction efforts, it is likely
that the Office of the Secretary ofDefense (OSD) will still require A-76 based outsourcing
efforts [Ref. 1]. The CNO has directed A-76 studies of 80,500 positions, 70,500 civilian
and 10,000 military [Ref. 60]. The projected savings from these efforts are $2.5 billion,
15
and these savings have already been programmed into the Navy budget cycle, whether or
not they are achievable. The impact of combining A-76 competitive sourcing studies and
regionalization initiatives is discussed in detail in Chapter IV.
16
ffl. CURRENT REGIONAL STRUCTURES
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
Although the broad goals of regionalization were clear at the outset, specific
guidance on regional implementation and regional command structures was not provided.
Regional Commanders were creating their organizations "from scratch," guided chiefly by
the CNO's four guiding principles. However, as the major resource claimant for the
Navy's prototype region, the Southwest Region, CINCPACFLT has amassed considerable
regionalization expertise. The CINCPACFLT Facilities (N46) organization was an early
and proactive proponent of infrastructure reduction, and many of its initiatives have been
adopted as Navy standards. As a result, the three regions studied share several key,
common assumptions.
Chief among the common assumptions is the intent to achieve savings through
"best business practices." KPMG Peat Marwick provided consulting services in support
of implementation efforts in each of the three regions studied. Analysts from KPMG
assisted in establishing core functions, made recommendations regarding best business
practices, and ran preliminary activity-based costing (ABC) models. In addition to
providing a third party view of the issue, KPMG served to "cross-pollinate" the regions.
Each region uses a similar matrix organization. The Regional Commander is
responsible for providing all non-operational support functions to tenants and customers.
BOS functions are separated into "programs" and executed by program managers who
report to the Regional Commander. Program managers may be base and activity
17
commanding officers or other designated personnel. An advisory body comprised of
customer commands advises the Regional Commander. The CENCPACFLT notional
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Figure 3-1, CINCPACFLT Notional Matrix Organization [Ref. 5]
Although the flow of funds within regions is quite different, the flow of funds into
the region is standardized. The Regional Commander receives BOS funding for all
activities in the region from the major claimant and determines allocation and execution of
funds. Regional Commanders retain 31 U.S. Code Anti-deficiency Act Section 1517
authority and are personally accountable for overobligation of funds. Operational funds
18
flow directly via Type Commanders to deployable units. A notable exception is flying
hour program and Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (ADVCD) funding,
provided by CENCPACFLT to Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet
(COMNAVAIRPAC). COMNAVAIRPAC retains Anti-deficiency Act Section 1517
authority for these funds and distributes them through Regional Commanders to air
stations. The funds are "fenced" and cannot be reprogrammed or redistributed by the
Regional Commander. This relationship is summarized in Figure 3-2.
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Figure 3-2, Aviation Funding and Reporting
OPNAV did not dictate a standard regional structure. Proponents of
regionalization point out that by avoiding a "cookie cutter" mentality, regions were
organized to be more responsive to unique missions, customer needs, and geographic
constraints in a given region. The result is that the three regions studied share common
19
assumptions but are different in philosophy, function, and command structure. There are
also notable differences in the level of participation in the regions by Navy commands
residing in the concentration areas. The remainder of this chapter will describe the current
composition of these three regions, comparing and contrasting their respective
approaches.
B NAVY REGION SOUTHWEST
1. Regional History
The San Diego area was the Navy pilot site for development of the concept to
regionalize common installation management functions. A Streamlined Business Case
Analysis (SBCA) was performed. The SBCA methodology identified twenty potential
common support functions, established teams to analyze each function, and reported the
findings of the team in the SBCA format. Reports included an executive summary,
objective/scope of analysis, assumptions and constraints, current concept of operations,
proposed concept of operations, and cost analysis, used to project savings resulting from
regionalization.
On 10 October 1996 the DCNO (Logistics) approved the recommendations
contained in the San Diego SBCA for immediate implementation and directed that
implementation, "...must be completed as soon as possible (no later than FY 1999) [Ref
13]. CINCPACFLT was designated to lead the implementation. Geographic
consolidation was directed as follows:
• Transfer of all class 1 and 2 real property ownership in San Diego to CINCPACFLT.
20
• Creation of three Naval complexes in San Diego including redesignation ofNAB
Coronado from a separate command to an annex ofNAS North Island.
• Designation ofCINCPACFLT hosts for each ofthe three geographic hosts.
• Transfer of all installation management functions from current tenants and hosts to the
three geographic hosts (Point Loma, Coronado, Mainside), per the Geographic
Consolidation SBCA, with commensurate decreases in management and support
personnel.
• Specific staffing of resultant organization to be developed by CINCPACFLT with
assistance from other affected claimants [Ref. 13].
In addition to geographical consolidation, OPNAV directed the following:
• Regionalize common Bachelor Quarters functions under a single command per the
Bachelor Quarters SBCA.
• Regionalize common environmental functions under a single command per the
Environmental SBCA as long as no Commanding Officer is placed in legal jeopardy.
• Regionalize common base security functions under a single command with "precincts"
at the three host commands per the Security SBCA.
• Regionalize Safety under a single command per the Safety SBCA as long as
responsibility versus control issues can be addressed.
• Continue FISC San Diego partnering efforts for all commands in San Diego per the
Retail Supply SBCA.
• Consolidate resource management (comptrollers) by claimant per the Resource
Management SBCA.
• Consolidate Freight Transportation under FISC San Diego after further study of the
process. Include PWC San Diego in any further study of freight transportation.
• Consolidate Mail services under FISC San Diego per the Admin Services SBCA.
• Regionalize Food Services (galleys) under a single command per the Food Services
SBCA
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On 01 October 1998 Commander Naval Base, San Diego became Commander,
Navy Region Southwest.
2. Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles
In an August 1998 Naval Message announcing the results of the Naval Southwest
Region Installation Commanders Regionalization/Planning Conference, the Regional
Commander stated the Southwest Region's mission and vision. The mission statement
noted: "We are a regional team dedicated to providing the highest level of base operating
support and quality of life services for all operating forces and shore activities in the
southwest region." The Southwest Region's Vision: "We will be recognized as the leader
in shore installation management. One team, one voice, one mission"[Ref 11]. The
guiding principles are those of the CNO: "no tenant should do what a base can do more
cost effectively; no base should do what a region can do more cost effectively; no region
should do what the surrounding community can do more cost effectively" [Ref 16].
Individual programs would develop their own Mission, Vision, and Guiding principles.
3. Regional Area
The Southwest Region includes the states of California, Nevada, and Arizona.
The commands consolidated into the region include Naval Station Thirty-second Street,
Naval Air Station Coronado, Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, Submarine Base Point
Loma including the Fleet Combat Training Center and the Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare
Training Base, and the Naval Medical Center. Other supported commands in the San
Diego Metropolitan area include Space and Naval Warfare Command, Fleet and Industrial
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Supply Center, Public Works Center, and other Naval activities. Excluded are all Marine
Corps activities.
The Ventura County Complex contains Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS) Point
Mugu and Construction Battalion Center (CBC) Port Hueneme. Naval Air Station (NAS)
Fallon, Nevada, NAS Lemoore, California and Naval Air Facility (NAF) El Centro,
California are included in the region as "Over the Horizon" activities. Other activities
outside the San Diego metropolitan area include the Naval Weapons Stations at Seal
Beach, Fallbrook, and Concord, California. Three California Naval activities remain as
stand-alone bases not included in any region: NAWS Corona, Naval Post Graduate School
(NPS) Monterey, and NAWS China Lake. Figure 3-3 summarizes the geographic region.
4. Regionalized Functions
The Base Operating Support functions provided by Commander, Navy Region
Southwest include: Freight Transportation, Material Procurement, Retail Supply, Food
Service, Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR), Bachelor Quarters (BQ)/Housing,
Family Support, Security, Safety/Federal Fire, Air Operations, Weapons, Maintenance,
Vehicles/Support Equipment, Utilities, Facilities Acquisition, Land use, Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC), Port Operations, Ranges, Environmental, and Medical/Dental.
Included in the Family Services are Family Service Centers, Family Advocacy Program,
and Child Development Centers.
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Figure 3-3, Southwest Region Area of Responsibility [Ref. 16]
5. Regional Structure
Given the very large geographical, financial and support responsibilities of the
Southwest Regional Commander it is not surprising that a fairly large and complex
organization has been created to execute the regional mission. Command relationships are
sufficiently complex that customers of the region have dubbed the organizational chart
"the cosmic radiator".
The Regional Commander reports directly to CINCPACFLT and is responsible for
execution of the regional mission and budget, as well as all Class I and II property in the
region. The Regional Business office directly supports the Regional Commander and is
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responsible for financial planning and execution, metrics, and strategic planning. The
Regional Business Manager is the Commanding Officer ofFISC San Diego.
Supporting the staff are the Assistant Chiefs of Staff (ACOS). These include:
ACOS Logistics, also CO, Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) and the Regional
Business Manager; ACOS Facilities, also CO, PWC; ACOS Infrastructure Planning;
ACOS Support Services, ACOS Information Technology, also CO, NCTS; ACOS Public
Safety, also CO, Point Loma Complex; ACOS Air Operations, also CO, Coronado; ACOS
Weapons, also CO Seal Beach; ACOS Port Operations, also CO, Thirty Second Street;
ACOS Ranges, also CO, NAS Fallon; ACOS Environmental, also CO, Point Loma; and
ACOS, Health Services, also CO, Naval Medical Center. The ACOS is responsible for
providing assigned services to each activity within the region, and provides, "the technical
expertise, technical and specific training, program policy and standards, and allocation of
resources (People & Money) at the Macro Level" [Ref. 12]. It is important to note here
that although the COs are advocates for their respective bases, they no longer control
allocation of resources or levels of service. This represents a significant change in Navy
culture.
ACOSs are assisted in many cases by Program Managers (PM). One PM is
assigned for each of the functions described above. In those cases where the ACOS is not
also the PM, the PM oversees execution of individual programs. The Regional
Commander is also supported by Directors, who oversee Internal Support Functions.
They include Directors for Civilian Personnel, Command Evaluation, Legal Support,
Public Affairs, Religious Services, Military Personnel, and Administration.
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The Regional Executive Steering Committee (ESC) is responsible for, "defining
and deploying regional strategy, allocation of resources, monitoring performance and
customer feedback, and identifying areas for improvement" [Ref 12]. Membership of the
ESC includes the Regional Commander and Chief of Staff, the Regional Command Master
Chief, the twelve ACOSs, and those base COs who are not also ACOSs. The ESC
advisors include the directors and a non-voting union representative.
Finally, a Customer Advisory Board (CAB) advises the ESC. The CAB consists
of Claimant representatives, AIRPAC, SURFPAC, SUBPAC, SPECWAR, CNET,
SPAWAR, Base CO/XO/CMC, ACOSs, Directors, and the Southwest Region CMC.
Figure 3-4 summarizes the organization.
The ACOSs are able to provide services to geographically dispersed activities
through a "storefront" concept. Instead of individual services funded by and reporting to
base Commanding Officers, service providers reside on bases but are centrally funded and
report to the appropriate ACOS or PM. Essentially, the same people perform the same
functions at the same activities as they did prior to regionalization, but a layer of middle
management may be eliminated by consolidating individual base managerial functions at
the regional level.
6. Flow of Funds
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Figure 3-4, Southwest Region Command Structure [Ref. 52]
Budget holder for the region and has Anti-deficiency Act Section 1517 responsibility for
BOS funds. The regional Comptroller is a Supply Corps 0-6, who reports directly to the
Regional Business Manager. The Comptroller is supported by a Budget Division, a
Financial Services Division, and a Program Analysis Division.
The Budget Division performs budget execution/formulation, Civilian Personnel
budget and payroll, Program Management support, and Resource Management/Program
Manager support. The Financial Services Division performs fiscal accounting, fiscal
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services, financial systems support, and disbursing and examination support. The Program
Analysis Division monitors interservice support agreements/Memorandums of Agreement,
Regional Business Office support, and Resource Analysis.
Funds Flow: CPF-N46 BOS
Perspective Today
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Figure 3-5, Southwest Region Flow of Funds [Ref. 52]
From the CINCPACFLT perspective, the flow of BOS funds is vastly simplified
under regionalization. Seven operating budgets have been consolidated into two, and
financial reporting is likewise consolidated. The Ventura County Complex has remained
an operating budget (OB) holder because of the inability to consolidate all official
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accounting records under one Defense Finance and Accounting Service Operating
Location (DFAS OPLOC). This issue will be addressed further in Chapter IV.
Commander, Navy Region Southwest (CNRSW) distributes BOS funds along
program lines, except that the three "Over the Horizon" activities are Operating Target
(OPTAR) holders. CNRSW plans to combine these OPTARs under a "Remote Site
Offices" concept in FY 2000. ACOSs and Program Managers distribute available funds,
and storefront accounting activities perform financial execution, accounting, and reporting
functions. Figure 3-5 depicts the flow of funds in the region.
C. NAVY REGION HAWAn
1. Regional History
Regionalization studies began in the Pearl Harbor area in mid- 1996, and a four-
phase process was envisioned. The steps are summarized in Figure 3-6 [Ref. 47].
^2Kb There are Four Phases to the Pearl Harbor
Regionalization Process:
1. Activity Based Costing (ABC) Workshops: assignment of resource costs to actual
activities performed in a functional area.
2. Benchmarking/Best Practices: find the best way to perform a process and apply it.
3. Business Process Reengineering (BPR): rethinking and redesign of the process
and organization to achieve dramatic improvements in cost and time.
4. Regional Design: using data in previous three phases to structure the most
efficient organization.
Figure 3-6, Phases In The Regionalization Process, [Ref. 47]
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From September to November 1996 COMNAVBASE Pearl Harbor, assisted by
KPMG Peat Marwick, coordinated the efforts of eighteen SBCA teams and completed
business case analyses for the BOS support functions studied. The studies were
completed and forwarded to OPNAV N46 for review, projecting annual savings of $18
million.
On 11 August 1997 the DCNO (Logistics) approved the recommendations
contained in the Pearl Harbor SBCA for immediate implementation and directed that
implementation, "...must be completed as soon as possible (no later than FY 2000) [Ref.
14]. CINCPACFLT was designated to lead the implementation.
Geographic consolidation was directed as follows [Ref. 14]:
• Transfer of all class 1 and 2 real property ownership in Pearl Harbor, with
limited exemptions, to CINCPACFLT.
• Consolidation of all Navy base support on Oahu under one command and one
major claimant (CINCPACFLT).
• Merger ofNAVSTA Pearl Harbor, SUBBASE Pearl Harbor, and NAS
Barbers Point into a single command.
• Transfer of all installation management functions from current tenants and
hosts to the single host, or other commands as designated by CINCPACFLT,
per the Pearl Harbor SBCAs, with commensurate decreases in management
and support personnel.
• Development of specific staffing of resultant organization by CINCPACFLT
with assistance from other affected claimants
.
In addition to Geographical consolidation, OPNAV directed the following [Ref 14]:
• Regionalize common real property management functions under a single
command per the Real Property Management SBCA.
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• Regionalize common environmental functions under COMNAVBASE Pearl
Harbor with individual commands retaining specific functions per the
Environmental SBCA.
• Regionalize common base security functions under a single command
designated by CINCPACFLT with daily operations directed through East and
West precincts per the Security SBCA.
• Regionalize safety under a single lead activity designated by CINCPACFLT
per the Safety SBCA.
• Implement the process improvements and cost reduction initiatives identified in
the Procurement SBCA. Complete the FISC partnering efforts and continue
dialogue to move towards a single procurement activity in the region.
• Regionalize passenger transportation on Oahu under a single lead activity per
the Passenger Transportation SBCA.
• Consolidate freight transportation under FISC Pearl Harbor per the Freight
Transportation SBCA.
Regionalize all retail supply operations for all activities under partnership with
FISC Pearl Harbor per the Retail Supply SBCA.
Consolidate Public Affairs functions under a single regional office under
COMNAVBASE Pearl Harbor per the Public Affairs SBCA.
Consolidate common resource management functions under COMNAVBASE
Pearl Harbor and standardize accounting systems and hardware/software per
the Resource Management SBCA.
Consolidate and regionalize ADP/TT services under the RITC concept per the
ADP/IT SBCA. Expand consolidation beyond the CINCPACFLT claimancy
to all activities on Oahu.





• Regionalize Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) functions under a single
command per the MWR SBCA.
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The region was formally instituted 01 October 1998, and regionalization of
functions is ongoing. The SBCA functional team studies were subsequently revised, and
annual savings are now estimated at $2,083 million [Ref. 22]. Phases two through four of
the process are not complete.
2. Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles
The mission of the Pearl Harbor Region is, "to support the Navy's 'product line';
forward-deployed ships, submarines and aircraft that influence events real-time around the
world"[Ref. 47]. The first Pearl Harbor Regionalization status report identified the vision:
"Our vision for the region is that implementing regionalization in Pearl Harbor will result
in increased support and service to the ships, planes, submarines and the sailors and their
families stationed in Hawaii" [Ref. 10]. The guiding principles are identical to those of the
CNO and the Southwest Region.
3. Regional Area
Navy Region Hawaii includes Naval Activities on the Islands of Oahu and Kauai.
The Pearl Harbor Complex is comprised of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Naval Station
Pearl Harbor, Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, and Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Pearl
Harbor. Other Tenants include the Navy Intermediate Maintenance Facility and
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Other activities on the Island include Naval
Magazine Lualualei, the Naval Communications Area Master Station, Eastern Pacific, the
Naval Security Group Activity, Kunia, and Naval Air Station Barbers Point.
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Navy Region Hawaii is geographically the smallest region, and regionalization of
many functions has been facilitated as a result. Figure 3-5 summarizes the region.
4. Regionalized Functions
The eighteen regionalized functions are: ADP/IT, Command Evaluation/IG,
Command and Staff, Safety, Consolidated Housing and Barracks, Environmental, Family
Services (including Family Advocacy), Food Services, MWR, Port Operations,
Procurement, Public Affairs, Facilities Management, Resource Management, Retail
Supply, Security, Training, and Transportation.
5. Regional Structure
The concentrated nature of Navy activities in Hawaii has made regionalization of
functions in the Hawaii region a slightly less daunting task than was the case in the
Southwest Region. All activities are serviced by the same DFAS OPLOC, and face to
face coordination is possible for most issues.
The Regional Commander Reports directly to CINCPACFLT and is responsible for
execution of the regional mission and budget, as well as all Class I and II property in the
region. The Regional Business Manager position was created as a result of regionalization
and is filled by a Civil Engineering Corps 0-6. The regional business manager directly
supports the Regional Commander and is responsible for, "financial planning and
execution, strategic planning, resource allocation based on a business like approach, and
assisting Program Managers to ...provide equal or better service at less cost" [Ref. 42].
Unlike the Southwest Region, the Hawaii area Regional Business Manager is a dedicated
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Figure 3-7, Navy Region Hawaii [Ref. 22]
Supporting the staff are the Program Managers. Program Managers are
responsible for, "the management, control and carrying out the assigned regionalization
program and to provide the Installation Commander (IC) with functional support and
service to perform the assigned mission. The Program Manager also exercises control
over resources (personnel/funding) and develops regional budget requirements" [Ref. 46].
Additionally, PMs, "will also execute annual budgets in accordance with budget guidance
and priorities set by Pearl Harbor Shore Executive Board (SEB) and ensure high standards
and customer requirements are being met... Program managers are responsible for the
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safety, welfare, professional development of personnel and working environment and
functions similar to a tenant in a host/tenant relationship" [Ref 46]. The Hawaii Region
PMs include: PM Medical Services, also CO NAVMEDCEN; PM Dental Services, also
CO Navy Dental (NAVDEN); PM Regional Chaplain, PM Training, also CO, Navy
Submarine Training Center, Pacific (NSTCP); PM, Base Communications also CO Naval
Computer and Telecommunications Command (NCTAMS); PM Port Operations, also CO
NAVSTA Pearl Harbor; PM Air Operations, also CO, NAS Barbers Point; PM Range
Operations, also CO, PMFR; PM, Ordnance (Air and Sea), also CO, NAVMAG
Lualualei; PM Supply/Logistics, also CO, FISC; PM, Retail Supply, also CO, FISC; PM,
Freight Transportation, also CO, FISC, PM, Procurement, also CO, FISC; PM, Facilities
Management, also CO, PWC; PM, Environmental, also CO, PWC; PM, Passenger
Transportation, also CO, PWC; PM Procurement - Facilities and Maintenance, also CO,
PWC; PM Safety, also CO, PWC; PM Base Services, also CO, NAVSTA Pearl Harbor;
PM Family Services, also CO, NAVSTA Pearl Harbor; PM, Federal Fire, also CO,
NAVSTA Pearl Harbor; PM, Security, also CO, NAVSTA Pearl Harbor; PM Food
Services also CO, NAVSTA Pearl Harbor; PM MWR, also CO, NAVSTA Pearl Harbor;
PM, Bachelor Quarters, also CO, NAVSTA Pearl Harbor. The Regional Commander is
also supported by Special Assistants, who oversee Internal Support Functions. These
include Special Assistants for: Intergovernmental Affairs, Ford Island, PAO, Inspector
General, Regional Environment Counsel, Public Safety, and JAG. The Regional
Structures are illustrated in Figures 3-8 and 3-9.
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The Shore Executive Board serves the Regional Commander as an executive
decision making and advisory board. The SEB has five guiding principles [Ref. 58]:
• Within SEB, members are first regional advisors to the Regional Commander, second,
Commanding Officers and/or Program Managers.
• Think and manage regionally.




• Teamwork and creative solutions will be rewarded.
























Figure 3-8, Navy Region Hawaii Command Structure [Ref. 42]
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Membership of the SEB is divided into voting members and observers. Voting
members include the Regional Commander and Chief of Staff, the Regional Business
Manager, the COs of NAVSHIPYARD Pearl Harbor, PACMISRANFAC HAWAREA
Barking Sands, NAVSTA Pearl Harbor, NAS Barbers Point, PWC Pearl Harbor, FISC
Pearl Harbor, NCTAMS PAC Honolulu, and NAVMAG Lualualei. Observers include
COs of NAVDENCEN Pearl Harbor, NAVMEDCLINIC Pearl Harbor,
NAVPACMETOCCEN Pearl Harbor, NAVSECGRUACT Kunia, and
NAVSUBTRACENTPAC Pearl Harbor.
Navy Region Hawaii also utilizes the storefront concept. Instead of individual
services funded by and reporting to base Commanding Officers, service providers reside
on bases but are centrally funded and report to the appropriate PM. The regions stated
"Storefront Synergy Goal" is "Sharing personnel and costs to perform various functions
equals efficiency and savings" [Ref. 58].
6. Flow of Funds
Commander, Navy Region Hawaii is the primary Operating Budget holder for the
region, and has Anti-deficiency Act Section 1517 responsibility for BOS funds. The
regional Comptroller is a GS-14, who reports directly to the Regional Business Manager.
The Resource Management/Comptroller division is supported by fifty-five personnel [Ref.
42]. The Division performs budget execution/formulation, CIVPERS budget and payroll,
and Resource Management.
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Figure 3-9, Navy Region Hawaii Staff [Ref. 58]
BOS funding in the Hawaii region is distributed along program lines by the
Regional Business Manager staff. Program Managers distribute available funds, and
storefront accounting activities perform financial execution, accounting, and reporting
functions. All programs studied for regionalization are expected to be fully implemented
by 01 October 1999.
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D. NAVY REGION NORTHWEST
1. Regional history
The Pacific Northwest Region is the most recently formed of the three regions
examined. Unlike the Southwest and Hawaii Regions, no SBCA was performed for the
Northwest Region. Instead, under the leadership of COMNAVBASE Seattle, thirty
functional areas were "examined" based on the experience of the other Pacific Regions,
with CINCPACFLT guidance, and initial KPMG support. From the thirty functions
studied, thirteen regional programs were identified. No cost savings estimate was
performed.
Prior to standing up a regional organization, the Navy Working Capital Funded
(NWCF) Puget Sound Naval Shipyard had to be segregated into BOS and NWCF
activities. As a result, Naval Station Bremerton was created. NAVSTA Bremerton, an
0-6 command, was created to separate support ofhomeported ships from shipyard funded
activities.
CINCPACFLT was the approval authority for regional consolidation in the
Northwest, and regionalization plans were approved in July 1998. On 01 October 1998,
Commander, Navy Region Northwest assumed responsibility for BOS functions in the
area. Because of the accelerated nature of the regionalization implementation, ICC,
regionalization, and preliminary A-76 studies happened nearly simultaneously.
Regionalization of programs is ongoing throughout Fiscal Year 1 999, with all programs
scheduled to be fully regionalized by 01 October 1999.
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2. Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles
The Regional Mission statement is as follows:
As the regional coordinator for the Navy in the four-state area of
Washington, Oregon, Idaho and Alaska, Navy Region Northwest
provides coordination of base operating support functions for
operating forces throughout the region. This includes providing
expertise in areas such as facilities and land space management,
exercise coordination, housing, environmental, security, family
services, port services, air services, bachelor quarters and
logistical concerns for the thousands of Navy members and their
families in the area, including homeported and transient ships,
submarines and aircraft, as well as afloat and ashore tenants. The
command also serves as the reporting senior for the Commander
in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Hawaii, for Naval
Air Station Whidbey Island; Naval Station Everett; Naval Station
Bremerton and Submarine Base Bangor [Ref. 50].
The Region provided the most comprehensive vision statement and guiding
principles of any region studied. In addition to the CNO's four "cardinal" principles, the
philosophy of the region has been narrowly defined: [Ref. 49].
VISION STATEMENT
The US Navy in the Puget Sound will become, by the turn
of the century, more like a single integrated business. Fleet
units and shore commands will focus on core missions and
functions. Support services will align into
regional/subregional "businesses" to provide improved fleet
readiness while reducing cost. This realignment will result
from fair and open collaboration between area commands
and federal activities, local communities, customers and
employees. Puget Sound naval installations will become the
model for similar Navy activities and civilian enterprises.
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GUIDING PRINCIPLES
There is strength in regionalization. The more efficient we become, the
more solid our foundation.
The objective (is) to reduce costs for shore support so more resources will
be available for readiness, modernization and people/QOL.
Change will normally only be initiated to achieve expected improvements in
services or cost reduction/avoidance.
Commit to fairness and to continuously revitalizing our work force through
training and new hires.
Open, timely communication is critical. Conflicting, confusing, inaccurate
information can destroy trust and delay worthwhile initiatives.
There is no "end state"
Build the idea of "continuous learning, change and improvement" into
every organizational layer and business.
Some things are beyond our purview or control. Focus primary attention
on areas we can improve.
No tenant should do what a host can do. No host should do what can be
done by a regional or subregional business.
The Navy should not do what the surrounding community can do better or
more cost effectively.
The number of tenants and host commands providing support services will
be reduced to the minimum.
Seek partnerships with other DoD and Federal agencies, local governments
and community entities to improve performance or reduce costs.
There is no single "right answer."
Enable Navy service providers to become as competitive as possible prior
to exploring outsourcing and privatization options.
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• Change will not be constrained by traditional organizational boundaries.
• Cost avoidance or savings will not be achieved by transferring costs to
other activities.
• Don't wait for funding lines to be "sorted out" before making needed
business or organizational changes. Use MOUs and ISAs to move toward
the future and drive funding requirements.
• Savings or cost avoidance should be reinvested back into regionalization
when such investments can yield further savings or cost avoidance.
• "Don't close the storefronts. " Maintain direct contact with and full
involvement of customers.
• Centralizing or regionalizing functions will not impair customer services.
• Decision making authority should be kept close to the customer. Don't
substitute asking permission for making a decision that is yours to make.
• Know the customers - internal and external - and their requirements.
• Incorporate Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) that support realistic shore
and long term goals and milestone. Customer MOEs and expectations
should be our primary measures of success.
• Learn from and build on the success of earlier regionalization efforts in our
own and other regions.
3. Regional Area
The Northwest Region encompasses the four-state area of Washington, Oregon,
Idaho and Alaska. It is the Navy's third largest fleet concentration area [Ref. 50]. The
major Navy installations in the region include: Naval Station Bremerton, Naval Station
Everett, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, and Submarine Base Bangor. Other Naval
Commands in the Pacific Northwest include: Commander, Submarine Group Nine; Puget
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Sound Naval Shipyard; Naval Hospital Bremerton; Naval Hospital Oak Harbor; Naval
Dental Center Northwest; Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport; Fleet and Industrial
Supply Center Puget Sound; Human Resource Regional Center Silverdale; Fleet Imaging
Command Pacific; Commander, Electronic Combat Wing Pacific Fleet; Commander,
Patrol Wing 10; Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility Pacific Northwest; Naval Radio
Station Jim Creek, and Naval Ordnance Center PACDIV, Port Hadlock Detachment.
Figure 3-1 1 depicts the region.
Despite the seemingly concentrated geographic area of the major bases and
tenants, the unique geography of the Puget Sound area makes regional coordination
problematic. The bases are separated by large expanses of water, known locally as the
"Sound barrier." The difficulty of achieving physical contact with Directors, Program
Managers, and Commanding Officers has been a major issue in the regionalization of
PACNORWEST. Figure 3-12 is included to illustrate the time required to move between
activities within the region.
4. Regionalized Functions
The thirteen support programs identified for regionalization included eight which
began operating regionally on 01 October 1998: Resource Management, Port Operations,
Community Programs, Information Technology, Public Safety, Food Services,
Management of Real Property/Public Works, Logistics/Material Transportation. The five
remaining programs that are expected to be regionalized by 01 October 1999 include:
Environmental, Audio/Visual, Command & Staff, CIVPERS/MILPERS, and Safety.
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Several functions that are stand-alone programs in the other regions are combined
under one program in PACNORWEST. Community Programs includes Bachelor
Quarters, MWR, Family Services and Family Housing. Public Safety includes Fire, Police,
and Disaster Management. Programs not assigned program managers are managed by
installation Commanding Officers.
5. Regional Structure
As the newest of the three regions studied, the Northwest regional structure is still
evolving. However, the key elements and basic structure are firmly in place. The
Regional Commander Reports directly to CINCPACFLT and is responsible for execution
ofthe regional mission and budget, as well as all Class I and II property in the region. The
Regional Business Manager is a Supply Corps 0-5 who was transferred TDY from FISC
Puget Sound and is physically located within the Regional Commanders building and staff.
Unlike the other regions, the Northwest Regional Comptroller does not report to the
Regional Business Manager. The Comptroller position was created for the regionalization
effort and the Comptroller reports directly to the Regional Commander/Chief of Staff
The Northwest Regional Commander is supported and advised by the Board of Directors.
The Board is composed of the Commander and Chief of Staff of the Region and
Commanding Officers ofNaval Submarine Base, Bangor, Naval Station Everett, Naval Air
Station Whidbey Island, and Naval Station Bremerton. The Board is described as the
means to sustain a "collegia!" process, and consensus for the sake ofthe region is stressed.
Directors, as well as Commanding Officers of major commands providing program


























Figure 3-10, Northwest Region [Ref. 51]
The Region is also served by a "Guiding Coalition" that consists of the Regional
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Commander, Chief of Staff, Board of Directors, and the Commanding Officers of TRF
Bangor, FISC Puget Sound, EFA Northwest, NCTS Puget Sound, PSNS, NUWC



















Figure 3-11, Distance Between Pacnorwest Activities [Ref. 51]
Supporting the Board of Directors/ACOSs are Program Managers and Deputy
Program managers. The program managers are responsible for management and execution
of program functions and budgets across the region. There are Program Managers for
Audio Visual, Command and Staff, Community Services, Environmental Services, Food
Services, Information Technology, Material Transportation, Port Operations, Public
Safety, Public Works/MRP, Financial Resources Management, Retail Supply, and Safety.
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Deputy Program Managers exist for Bachelor Quarters, Family Housing, Family Services,
MWR, Security, Fire, and Emergency Management. The Regional Structure is illustrated
in Figure 3-13.
Like the other two regions studied, Navy Region Northwest utilizes the storefront
concept to provide service throughout the region. The service providers reside on bases,
but are centrally funded and report to the appropriate PM. It is described by the Regional
Staff as follows: "At each local site, or storefront, we expect that the people currently
performing the function will continue to perform that function at the same location
working for the same boss. The primary responsibility of the local workers is to provide
the same high quality service ..." [Ref. 48].
Program Management Model
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Figure 3-12, Navy Region Northwest Command Structure [Ref. 51]
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6. Flow of Funds
Commander, Pacific Northwest Region is the only BOS Operating Budget holder
for the region and has Anti-deficiency Act Section 1517 responsibility for BOS funds.
The regional Comptroller is a GS-15 Civil Servant who is a member of the regional staff
and reports directly to the Regional Commander via the Chief of Staff. The Comptroller is
supported by a Budget Division, a Financial Systems and Reports Division, an Accounting
Division, a BOS Finance & Allocated Programs Division, and a Manpower & Program
Management Division, as shown in Figure 3-13. Storefront, or "field" personnel perform
funds administration at the program Manager/Base CO level. Additionally, the Regional
Comptroller is responsible for Command Evaluation. There are eighty-eight civilian
positions within the Comptroller Organization [Ref. 56].
All BOS funds for the Region are provided by CINCPACFLT to the Northwest
Regional Commander. The Budget is then distributed along program lines by the Budget
Division and the Comptroller and executed by the Program Managers. Accounting and
reporting is accomplished by the storefront organizations, reporting to the accounting
division for the Regional Comptroller organization.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Examination of the three regional commands described above reveals that,
although they are similar in structure and purpose, there are differences in their
philosophy, methodology, and roles. All three regions have efficiency as their primary
goal, but the degree to which regionalization is treated as a cost savings measure
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Figure 3-13, Northwest Region Comptroller Organization, [Ref. 56]
vice a performance enhancement measure differs. Also, because the regionalization of the
Hawaii and Northwest regions was accelerated, lessons learned from the Southwest
Region have not been applied, as was originally intended when COMNAVBASE San
Diego was chosen as the pilot regionalization site. Finally, the degree to which commands
in the regions have participated in and contributed to regionalization differs. These issues
are discussed in Chapter VI.
Despite the differences in the organizations, a common rhetoric is present in each -
the use of "best business practices" coupled with "measures of effectiveness" borrowed
from leading corporations and based on current business literature, to achieve greater
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efficiency and thereby improve levels of support while reducing costs. The keys to
evaluation of regionalization lie in determining what those business practices and measures
of effectiveness should be, determining the degree to which they have been applied, and
determining whether and to what extent this initiative is meeting its objectives.
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IV. STATUS OF REGIONS
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the status of regionalization and its
effects. The regions are not yet functioning in "most efficient organization" status, and it
would be premature to attempt to evaluate them. However, the regions are sufficiently
formed that some conclusions may be drawn about their structures, foci, and results to
date.
The comments, opinions, and experiences of personnel working on regional staffs,
personnel supported by the regions, and Type Commander personnel representing the
interests of operational forces will be included in this chapter. This will provide the
foundation for the discussion of evaluation criteria in Chapter V by linking the evolving
regional structures to the "best business" criteria against which they will be evaluated.
B. VIEWS ON ONGOING IMPLEMENTATION
1. Acceleration of Regionalization
Acceleration of regionalization has led to near simultaneous implementation of
major changes. Participants view this with concern. According to a Navy official on the
Southwest Regional Staff, "Trying to combine Installation Claimant Consolidation (ICC),
regionalization, and A-76 studies is like trying to land three airplanes on the same runway
at the same time. There is no way to plan it and execute it, you just have to do the best
you can and hope there isn't a disaster"[Ref. 36]. None of the three regions studied is yet
fully functioning along regional lines, yet regionalization has been accelerated. This
51
acceleration has caused ICC and regionalization to happen simultaneously in some cases.
The simultaneous occurrence of these two sweeping changes in Navy infrastructure,
combined with the initiation of A-76 studies, hinders the ability to reach Most Efficient
Organization (MEO).
VADM J.F. Amerault, DCNO Logistics, warned that by combining other 'Svedge"
reduction strategies with A-76 efforts, "...Navy may find itself in double jeopardy."
Manpower savings projections from regionalization and commercial sourcing may be
treated as cumulative by OSD, when in fact they may be the same billets. An official in the
CINCPACFLT Comptroller organization puts it this way: "ICC, regionalization, and A-76
projected cuts are the same people. It's triple jeopardy" [Ref. 25]. The primary danger in
combining these efforts, and their projected savings, is a result of the federal budgeting
process. As a result of budget planning in the Future Years' Defense Plan (FYDP), the
projected savings are taken up-front without regard to the consequences. In fact, Navy
budgets already have been adjusted to allow for savings from the three initiatives, despite
the fact that, even in the most optimistic estimates, substantial savings from the initiatives
are still two to three years off. Budget cuts in the midst of regionalization make it difficult
to separate the effects of one from the other.
Another pitfall associated with initiating A-76 commercial sourcing studies in the
midst of regionalization is that MEO has not been reached. A basic assumption of the
OSD outsourcing philosophy, highlighted by the CNO, is that existing Navy service
providers are allowed to compete with commercial providers in the outsourcing process.
If the studies are conducted in the midst of regionalization, before organizations reach
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MEO, it is more likely that functions will be outsourced to contractors who may not be as
efficient as the government activity they replace.
One regional comptroller described performing A-76 studies while regionalizing
as, "...a major, major mess" [Ref. 35]. In addition to the financial considerations already
noted, he pointed out the human factors. Workers, already unsure of their job security as a
result of regionalization, and performing additional functions necessary because of a hiring
freeze, are now directed to devote time and attention to a study designed to phase out
their jobs in favor of a civilian contractor. Low morale and reduced productivity are the
predictable results [Ref. 35].
Simultaneous implementation of regionalization and installation claimant
consolidation also has implications for resulting regional efficiency. By regionalizing
before ICC issues are resolved, regional funding and service levels are set without the full
benefit of assets, or a full appreciation of the customer base. The later inclusion of as yet
undetermined claimancy functions in the region may require increased funding and
manpower levels that may not be available from the transferring claimant. Moreover,
redundant capabilities that still remain within regions may reduce anticipated savings.
Finally, the acceleration of regionalization has hindered the application of lessons
learned from the San Diego pilot project to other regions and has contributed to
differences in regional structures that are not attributable to different mission requirements
and customer bases.
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2. Differences in Approach to Regionalization
Examination of the three regions reveals many differences. Each region has a
different organizational structure and, as a result, a different focus. The assignment of key
roles in each organization was predicated in part on the capabilities of the incumbents, and
their commitment to the regionalization process at the time of regionalization. This is
illustrated by the very different composition of Regional Business Manager/Comptroller
positions in the regions studied. Recall that the Southwest Region utilizes the
Commanding Officer ofFISC, San Diego as the Regional Business Manager (RBM) and a
Supply Corps 0-6 as the Comptroller. The Hawaii Region created an 0-6 RBM billet,
filled by a Civil Engineering Corps officer, supported by a civilian comptroller. The
Northwest Region uses an 0-5 Military RBM who is TDY from the FISC and created a
senior civilian comptroller position, who does not report to the RBM. These differences
have the potential to significantly affect the flow of resources.
The similarly non-uniform assignment of ACOSs, PMs, and Special Assistants to
manage those resources will undoubtedly affect program execution as well. For example,
SPAWAR Headquarters is located in the Southwest Region. SPAWAR receives some
basic support from the region, including security and fire protection, but does not fully
participate in the region. As a result, the Southwest Region Program Manager for
Information Technology is the CO ofNTCS, despite the fact that SPAWAR, the Navy IT
manager resides in the same region.
Additionally, the periodic rotation of personnel from positions created around
them will inevitably lead to assignment of individuals to key positions who have different
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skills, abilities, priorities, and attitudes toward regional support than do the incumbents.
This has prompted the Southwest Regional Staff to propose a "Regional University" to
train new Commanding Officers [Ref. 59].
The different mission and vision statements of the regions indicate differences in
focus and emphasis. The common theme of each is that by using "best business practices"
service will actually improve. The improved service will be provided in a more "cost
effective" manner, allowing funding of other Navy priorities. Despite having the same
major claimant, the three regions studied have approached regionalization differently.
They provide different services, different levels of service, and have different decision
making bodies. This does not mean that one is more or less efficient than the other.
However, there are some reasons for concern. Interestingly, the primary means of savings
in restructuring typically is achieved through manpower reduction, yet this is rarely
addressed. The Southwest Region has requested a limited Reduction in Force (RIF) but
has achieved most preliminary savings through attrition. The Hawaii region has stated
that a RIF is the tool of absolute last resort, while the Northwest Region has publicly and
repeatedly promised there will be no RTF [Refs 58, 48]. Relying totally on attrition caused
by retirements, resignations, and relocation has often resulted in people being assigned to
jobs for which they lack adequate skills [Ref. 34]. The cost associated with inefficiency
and re-training these people is not considered in regional cost projections
3. Standardization of Service
The lack of standardization among regions is illustrated by the announcement of
their new titles and missions. In the OPNAVNOTE announcing the revised activity titles
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and mission statements of the new Regional Commands, East Coast and West Coast
regions did not even have similar mission statements. For Commander, Navy Region
Southeast and Commander, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic, the mission is,
To perform military command of assigned Shore Activities; to coordinate
the provision of shore activity support to the operating forces of the Navy,
other naval activities and tenant commands; to sustain the provision of
specified funding, personnel and facilities support to assigned shore
activities; to assess and evaluate installation management functions, quality
of products, services and readiness of assigned shore activities, and to
perform such other functions and tasks as may be assigned by higher
authority [Ref. 8].
For Commander, Navy Region Hawaii, Commander, Navy Region Southwest, and
Commander, Navy Region Northwest, the mission is:
To provide consolidated base operations support as defined by the Core
Business Model; to own and provide facility and land space management
within its designated region and Navy concentration area; to exercise
coordination and command of assigned shore organizations; to provide
support to homeported and transient ships, submarines and aircraft as well
as afloat and ashore tenants, military and dependent personnel, and to
perform such other functions and tasks as may be assigned by higher
authority" [Ref 8]
The prescription of the Core Business Model as the basis for support leaves the
standards of support open to interpretation. This model was developed to standardize
accounting procedures for BOS support. Notably, it does not address specific levels or
standards of service.
Absence of standardization of services was a concern expressed by personnel of
CINCPACFLT, all the Regional Staffs, the three Type Commanders, and customers of the
region. Without a clear definition of the nature of the services provided and the minimum
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level of acceptable service, customers feel at the mercy of the ACOS or Program Manager
providing the service. A regional ACOS describes it as, "Personality-driven decision
making" [Ref 36]. A member of the COMNAVREG Hawaii staff, a vocal supporter of
regionalization and best business practices, expressed the opinion that, for regionalization
to work, "...we need a common level of support" [Ref. 32]. A CINCPACFLT senior
official, in summarizing the standardization concerns, said, "Everybody does it differently.
You will never get any savings that way. We need to define what's BOS and what's not
BOS" [Ref. 27].
Proponents of regionalization point out that regionalizing services will lead to
standardization. This can be both good and bad. An anecdotal, but widely held, opinion
is that the "three Navies" (i.e. Aviation, Surface, and Submarine) place different priorities
on services, resulting in different levels of service. Aviation bachelor quarters are said to
be of higher quality, followed by submarine community facilities, then by surface
community facilities. The different emphasis was due to differences in missions and
perspectives in the three communities. Regional management of this service will provide
all sailors with the same level of service regardless of warfare community. This may
frustrate some Navy communities, especially if it is provided at the lowest-cost level. The
appropriate level of service has yet to be defined.
Both supporters and detractors of regionalization express the critical need for
standardization of services and functions. Personnel familiar with regionalization history




The regionalization concept was championed by the N-4 Staff at OPNAV, and the
primary implementers have been members of logistics and support communities. This is
logical, because reducing the support infrastructure is largely a support function.
However, because of this narrow focus, communities outside the shore infrastructure
arena have a view of regionalization that ranges from complete ignorance, to distrust, to
open hostility. A senior official in the Southwest Region expressed that, "Real, clear
leadership is lacking, and that is holding us back. Organizational structure should follow
strategy: standardize, reduce cost, improve performance" [Ref. 37]. Another official in
the region expressed a belief that Navy leadership outside the OPNAV Logistics
organization, saying, " The OPNAV codes are not onboard" [Ref. 36]. An official in the
Northwest Region expressed a similar sentiment. " We were given direction to regionalize
with no idea what it really is. It was not thoroughly staffed at the OPNAV level. A
number of the other Claimants just 'blew it off" [Ref. 33]. Another PACNORWEST
staff member opined, "OPNAV doesn't know what happened. There was a lack of
coordination" [Ref. 34].
The CNO's order to regionalize was stated in general terms, and the order to
"...realign shore infrastructure where it makes sense" was interpreted by many claimants
as tacit approval not to participate. The non-participation of several major claimants in
regionalization, including SPAWAR, CNET, and NAVFAC, has reduced projected
savings in the regions.
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Subsequent regionalization guidance was often provided after regionalization
actions were already underway or complete, and acceleration of regionalization
contributed to this effect. Many obstacles to regionalization resulted, which Regional
Commanders must now resolve.
5. Obstacles to Regionalization
All of the regions studied, and their major claimant, are attempting to resolve
issues resulting from Installation Claimant Consolidation (ICC). The CINCPACFLT
Comptroller staff estimates the annual BOS shortfall resulting from insufficient ICC
budget-base transfers at over $45 million beginning in FY 1999[Ref. 25]. Personnel from
each region have expressed dissatisfaction with the ICC budget-base transfers that set the
baseline for regional budgets, and point out that claimants who did not transfer adequate
funds are now demanding full service. The claimants, in their defense, point out that they
experienced budget cuts themselves and lacked adequate support funds to transfer. This
has caused friction between regions and their customers. One Regional Commander,
believing a TYCOM had "short-changed" the region, threatened to RIF all civilian
employees performing a specific support function for operational units of the offending
command. CINCPACFLT was forced to intervene [Refs. 30, 26]. In another region, a
tenant command with a non-CINCPACFLT major claimant was informed it would be
treated as a reimbursable customer and would be required to provide funding for each
weapons support transaction. The comptroller of the organization expended considerable
effort in proving that, as a fleet customer, funding for that item of support was already
included in the region's budget and had been for several years [Ref. 38], The implications
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for service were clearly expressed by a CINCPACFLT Budget Officer: "We will provide
the service we have been funded for" [Ref. 25].
Another obstacle, related to the alleged lack of coordination at the OPNAV level,
is that Navy regulations and structures do not allow the flexibility to affect changes
necessary for the effective application of regionalization principles. Program Managers in
both the Southwest and Hawaii Regions expressed frustration resulting from personnel
management practices and Human Resources Office (HRO) rules. They consider the rules
unwieldy and inflexible and therefore impediments to the movement or dismissal of
personnel required in such a sweeping change [Refs. 32, 36].
Many support functions are provided by activities funded by Navy Working
Capital Funds. Only 0&M,N funds were negotiated in the ICC transfer, so duplication of
infrastructure exists within all the regions where NWCF activities provide support. A
Navy Region Hawaii RBM staffmember stated, "We still don't own the shipyard. There
is a large impact in not having them play"[Ref 32].
Because of the narrow focus on regionalization implementation at the OPNAV
level, and the lack of standardized structures and services, many key support issues remain
unresolved in the region. These issues have reduced or eliminated savings that
regionalization could provide. This is illustrated by the ongoing debate between Navy
Facilities Engineering Command and Navy Supply Systems Command activities in one
region. Both NAVFACENGCOM and NAVSUP have procurement and contracting as
core competencies. Although the nature of the goods and services procured by each
command is different, the fact remains that each maintains a large pool of contracting
60
personnel with extensive training in the same Federal Acquisition Regulations. Because
both commands desire to perform the procurement mission, redundant capabilities remain
within the region [Ref. 31].
A similar situation exists in the same region over the retail supply function.
Although the FISC has been appointed as the retail supply Program Manager, the Public
Works Center elected not to transfer its retail supply inventory or personnel to the FISC
for management. This resulted in redundant inventory items and manpower [Ref. 31].
Another illustrative example occurred when a command transferred the retail
supply function to the FISC but fought against the transfer of the billets previously
dedicated to the function, arguing that they had other, additional duties. They ultimately
transferred one military billet to the FISC, but not before removing the incumbent to a
different billet vacant at the time. This command now employs nine people instead of ten,
but has transferred more than half the work those people previously performed to the
region [Ref. 31]. According to CENCPACFLT personnel, these difficulties have been
common. The transferring claimants have "...played a shell game with the bodies. They
don't add up"[Ref. 25]. Many of these obstacles are a direct result ofNavy culture.
C. NAVY CULTURE
1. Navy Paradigms
A universal sentiment among all people interviewed for this study is that the
existence of "stove-pipe," or vertically integrated, support structures, a "rice-bowl"
mentality, and "flag-pole" command protectionism is limiting regional effectiveness.
According to a Program Manager in the Hawaii Region, "The human side [of
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regionalization] was totally overlooked. People are not playing, they're pulling out, hiding
bodies, and there's no commitment in the region. The lack of buy-in from COs led to the
reduced savings" [Ref. 32]. A senior consultant for KPMG, summarizing this
phenomenon, said, "... a key part of regionalization is being 'one Navy,' and you guys just
aren't there yet. You still have an Aviation Navy, a Surface Navy, a Submarine Navy, and
all the other support claimants fighting to defend their rice bowls" [Ref. 24].
The research for this work included interviews with several dozen regional and
CINCPACFLT personnel attempting to achieve savings through regionalization. The
existence of "stove-pipe" organizations, "rice-bowl" mentalities, and "flag-pole"
disagreements was universally cited as the biggest impediment to regional implementation
and achieving savings. Typical comments included: "The pots of money are still stove-
piped" [Ref. 28]. "There are too many stovepipes"[Ref. 32]. "The COs are a big
problem" [Ref. 26]. "We won't get anywhere until we cut down some flagpoles"[Ref.
31]. These tendencies are deeply rooted in the culture ofcommand at sea.
Warfare Communities have histories, traditions, and cultures that help provide the
esprit de corps essential to warfighting. The Commanding Officer at sea has the privilege
and burden of virtually unprecedented authority and responsibility. The CO is responsible
for every aspect of life on a ship and the actions of every member of the crew. A ship
must be totally self-sufficient while at sea, and all operational, maintenance, health,
discipline, and recreational concerns are under the purview of the CO. The CO is
rewarded and promoted based on how well he or she balances these myriad and often
conflicting requirements.
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Commanding Officers of large Navy bases typically arrive at these postings near
the end of a career that has been focused primarily on command at sea. Base
Commanding Officers are awarded these commands based on the results of a Major
Command Screening Selection board. The position is accepted with the expectation that
the Officer will receive the authority, responsibility, control of resources, and freedom of
action to pursue priorities in providing what the CO considers to be the level of support
that is in the
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best interests" of the Navy. Commanding Officers are evaluated and
promoted based on their performance compared to Commanding Officers of other bases in
the same claimancy. Essentially, until recently, Navy bases operated like Navy ships.
Under the regionalization concept, the role of the CO is significantly changed, and
his or her power and prestige are diminished. They no longer control the flow of
resources, level of services, or the workforce for their base. Instead, they are advocates
for their tenants and ACOSs or PMs for a regional function. The focus of command has
shifted from the prestige and personal power associated with controlling resources and
personnel to the more efficient provision of specific services. Instead of direct
competition, fundamental cooperation is required. Roles, expectations, and incentives
tend not to be well defined for installation and base Commanding Officers.
2. New Roles and Expectations
Clearly there is a lack of congruency between the traditional role of a Navy
Commanding Officer and the requirements of a Regional CO/ACOS/PM who must
cooperatively provide services to all regional bases while protecting the interests of his
own. Further, while management of a stand-alone, "stove-piped" activity required a
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generalist whose primary strength was in coordinating the activities of the experts assigned
to his command, the CO/ACOS/PM must now have specific knowledge of some base
support function. This lack of congruency has contributed to the implementation
obstacles discussed previously and is as yet unresolved. Navy Region Hawaii has defined
a model of the differing roles (Figure 4-1), but has not resolved the problem of conflicting
interests or differing skills [Ref. 22].
Regional personnel also expressed concern over the frequent rotation of military
personnel that is inherent in the military career structure. CO/PMs are replaced every two
to three years, usually by operational personnel with little experience in installation
management and varying attitudes towards regionalization. According to a senior official
in the Southwest Region, "Building a team is critical. Success is based on relationships,
cross-claimancy cooperation, trust and rapport. The frequent rotation of leaders is a
problem"[Ref. 37].
3. Incentives
There are few organizational incentives to be efficient in the current defense
structure. Because 0&M,N is an annual appropriation, service budgets are set at the start
of the fiscal year and must be fully executed by the end of the year. Commands with
surplus funds remaining at the end of the fiscal year are viewed unfavorably. They are not
free to use the funds in other ways the following year. The only real incentive to operate
more efficiently is the need to limit the impact of a budget cut.
The Navy personal incentive structure is based primarily on promotion to higher
rank and entrustment with ever-greater levels of responsibility. These rewards are earned
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by competing against personnel of equal rank in similar positions Because of this, Navy
personnel have ingrained in them a strong tendency to improve the performance and
quality of life of their current command at the expense of others. To voluntarily share
financial resources with a competing function is unthinkable for most Navy leaders. This
incentive system is at odds with regional goals of cooperation and standardization.
CO/PM Responsibilities ffHL
CO PM
• Officer in Command of Command Responsible for mgt, control and
Mission execution of program mission, task
CNB PH Representative Provide CO functional support and
• Advocate for personnel, tenants, service
^customers Exercises control over resources
Regional SEB Member as assigned Develops Regional Budget reqs
Coordinates with PMs Ensures high service level
• Assesses quality of BOS services standards
received Responsible for safety, welfare and
• NJP-retain for assigned personnel professional development of
Supported by functional store-fronts on personnel
the installation Functions similar to a tenant in a
Exercises military jurisdiction over host/tenant relationship
military and civilian assigned to UIC Manages the installation operations
Provides fitreps/appraisal input to PM target (OPTAR)
on ADDU store-front personnel as "CHAMPION" the functional teams
assigned by SEB cause
Integrates command mission/tenant
requirements with PMs on levels of
service
1630 JVov 7998
Figure 4- 1, Navy Region Hawaii CO/PM Roles [Ref. 22]
A senior official in the Southwest region stated, " The ACOS must be accountable;
it must be in his best interest to standardize, reduce cost, and improve performance. It's
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got to be real clear" [Ref. 37]. The lack of clarity of roles and conflicting incentives has
given rise to concern on the part of customers ofthe regions.
D. CUSTOMER CONCERNS
Operational customers of the regions and claimants who have declined to
participate in regionalization have expressed concern over the regionalization process.
These concerns over specific aspects of regionalization must be addressed by any criteria
developed to evaluate the process. Concerns focused primarily on standards of service,
funding, and priorities.
1. Service
Personnel representing Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(COMNAVATRPAC), Commander, Naval Surface Force, Pacific Fleet
(COMNAVSURFPAC), and Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet
(COMNAVSUBPAC) all expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of standardization of
services. Operational units of all three Type Commanders are homeported in each of the
regions studied. They contend that they have not been told what constitutes BOS
support, and that their units receive different levels of service depending on the region
providing support [Refs. 28, 29, 30]. It is they, and their personnel, who bear the cost in
loss of service or service quality resulting from regionalization.
Absence of defined standards, combined with the funding shortfall resulting from
ICC, has led to difficulty in negotiating Memoranda of Understanding and/or Host-Tenant
Agreements between regions and tenants. Because no formal agreement is in place in
many instances, individual tenants and customers feel they have little recourse in resolving
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disagreements regarding support. A non-CINCPACFLT tenant said, "What is common
support? It needs to be defined. Instead of dealing with one CO, we now have to
negotiate with eighteen ACOSs, and no ISAs (sic) are in place. An MOA should clearly
state what is provided"[Ref. 38]. Poor definition of services covered in regionalization
often results in units seeking aid from their TYCOM or, in the case of non-CENCPACFLT
commands, the Major Claimant. Thus, requests for routine services are elevated to the
Flag Officer level for resolution.
COMSUBPAC personnel questioned the alleged benefit of having one standard of
bachelor quarters support for all sailors. While acknowledging that the former SUBBASE
Pearl Harbor BEQ was better maintained than the NAVSTA Pearl Harbor BEQ prior to
regionalization, they maintain that the result of regional management ofBQ functions was
not to improve the standards at NAVSTA, but rather to allow them to deteriorate at
SUBBASE. Specifically, they state, "Maintenance is not being done. The building is
falling apart. There is no baseline" [Ref. 30].
In those cases where support is no longer provided from a storefront location at
the original site, the centralized service has been removed from customers. While this may
make economic sense, customers point out that their costs have not been factored into the
decision. The consolidation of PSD Pearl Harbor, for example, has resulted in sailors
traveling a much greater distance to receive personnel services. Operational units either
lose the productive time required for those sailors to walk a greater distance, in some
cases hours, or must provide vehicle transportation at additional cost to ship OPTAR
[Ref 30]. The intangible effect of inconvenience also is not included.
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Some services have been cut or reduced simply because of budget cuts
independent of regionalization. Because funding was carved out of the Navy budget in
advance of any real savings from regionalization, some service levels have been reduced.
This is not being effectively communicated to customers, who feel that regions are not
supporting them as their predecessor bases once did. A COMNAVAIRPAC official
stated,
ccWe are losing personnel while adding functions, causing people to work overtime.
Morale and quality of life suffer" [Ref. 28]. A COMSUBPAC official expressed a similar
sentiment, "The customers are not being supported the way they were before
regionalization. They've cut overtime on tugs, telephone support, and SUBPAC is
funding the difference. We are doing more with less - bottom line" [Ref. 30]. When
regions refuse to provide the level of support that TYCOMS consider necessary,
TYCOMS often resort to the use of mission funds for support functions [Refs. 26, 28,
30].
2. Funding
Tenants feel that they are being punished by reduced levels of support based on
actual or perceived shortfalls in budget-base funding transfers. A CINCPACFLT budget
officer made a statement to this effect [Ref. 25]. One mission funded tenant, for example,
said, "We didn't give a budget-base transfer, because we were already in the NAS North
Island budget base. Now we are being told, ' you didn't give us any money, so why
should we support you?' We are a fleet customer, but they are trying to treat us like a
reimbursable customer and recover costs" [Ref. 38].
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The difficulty in evaluating regionalization is compounded by the willingness of
TYCOMS and other claimants to fund support functions with operating budgets, as
discussed in the previous section. This understates BOS costs, masks the shortfalls in
BOS budgets, and overstates savings resulting from regionalization [Refs. 26, 28, 30].
3. Priorities
TYCOMs and tenants also expressed concern over the ability of Regional
Commands to prioritize elements of support in the same way that TYCOMs would rank
them. In the absence of standard levels of service, BOS funds are divided among
programs and bases within regions by the Regional Business staff and/or Comptroller
according to inputs from COs, PMs, and ACOSs. The priorities of the customers may
not, in some cases, be reflected in funding levels. The SUBBASE Pearl Harbor BEQ is
one example. Another is the funding of the OLYMPIC VENTURE, an ocean-going
personnel transfer craft, that PACNORWEST elected not to fund as a BOS function,
despite the high priority placed on this service by the TYCOM [Ref. 30]. Another
example is the refusal of the Southwest Region to fund Ombudsman support for
deployable aircraft squadrons homeported on their bases [Ref. 28].
Another concern expressed by COMNAVAIRPAC personnel results from the flow
of Flying Hour Program (FHP) funds (Figure 3-2). Labor is funded with BOS, including
FHP accounting personnel. The region cannot convert FHP funding for any other use and
derives no direct benefit from administering the funds, which are "fenced" by AIRPAC.
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AIRPAC personnel fear that the level of service in support of FHP functions will suffer
[Ref. 28].
Of course, CINCPACFLT is the major claimant for the three TYCOMs and
regions in this case. Because the region and the TYCOMs have a common superior, one
level above them in the chain of command, these concerns could be addressed. However,
this has not been the case for all customers. A Comptroller expressed the concern of
tenants from other claimancies in the southwest region. "Non-CINCPACFLT users get
the shaft. It's human nature" [Ref. 38].
E. BEST BUSINESS PRACTICES
1. Business Practices Applied
Each region examined claimed the application of "best business practices" as the
key factor enabling savings through regionalization. By applying lessons from industry
they hope to achieve efficiencies, reducing costs while improving services. The common
problem in each region, however, is that best business practices have not been defined,
published, codified, or followed. Many personnel in the regions and CINCPACFLT are
well versed on the current best practice literature. These personnel expressed frustration
at the lack of application of these techniques despite claims to the contrary. Specific
complaints included a failure to invest in enabling technology [Ref. 33], no benchmarking
or cooperative efforts with civilian business leaders [Ref. 32], and no published standards
[Refs. 28, 30, 32].
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2. Measures of Effectiveness
Related to non-standardized services and structures is the absence of measures of
effectiveness. The SBCA addressed changes from a current state to a proposed regional
state but made no attempt to define what a desired state should be. Because there was no
baseline, regions are not sure how to judge the effects of their efforts [Ref. 32]. Further,
the SBCAs, once approved and implemented, were set aside. To date real savings have
not matched projections [Ref. 22].
Efforts were made to utilize Activity Based Costing (ABC) and Activity Based
Management (ABM), with the assistance of KPMG, using ABC computer software [Ref.
24]. Because there is no standard definition of services or defined standards of services,
and because STARS/FL does not allow ABC, these efforts have so far been unproductive.
A KPMG employee stated, "You can't just try to 'improve.' You've got to set
benchmarks." In the words of a senior member of the Hawaii Regional Staff, "We have
no benchmarks, so we have no way of holding people's feet to the fire. [The Navy] is
lacking a willingness to make decisions and set goals. We need a good core business
model, ABC, and a set of benchmarks, industry standards. We need to drive management
to meet the benchmarks. We need some standard"[Ref 32].
The key to evaluating regionalization efforts, and to successfully implementing
regionalization, is the application of best business practices and measures of effectiveness.




The preceding discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive evaluation of
regionalization. Rather, the issues articulated here are being raised to illustrate the
challenges that regions, and their customers, are attempting to resolve as part of the
regionalization process. It would be unrealistic to expect such a sweeping change to
occur in the absence of evolutionary "growing pains." Also, many of the issues are
admittedly unrelated to regionalization but are, instead, the result of reduced Navy funding
levels. However, it would be imprudent to dismiss these concerns and expectations when
developing criteria to evaluate regionalization efforts. Clearly the four guiding principles
established in the CNO order to regionalize have not yet been realized.
The concerns and expectations of affected personnel and the prevailing culture of
the organizations studied provide the background against which "best business" based




Downsize excess workforce. Cut unneeded infrastructure. Cut
headquarters bureaucracy, adopt the best business practices in the industry,
go paperless wherever possible, and shed non-core business functions that
someone else can do more cheaply for you. And that, simply put, is what
we are doing in the Department of Defense today[Ref 9].
Secretary ofDefense William Cohen, 1998
What we set out to do can be divided into two parts: the first essentially a
series of management reforms of the kind to be found in any well-run
organization, an effort which is in large part covered by the formal five-
year Cost Reduction Program we set up in July 1962. The common
characteristic of such reforms is that they have very little to do with
military effectiveness, one way or the other. They merely save money by
introducing more efficient methods of doing things[Ref. 44].
Secretary ofDefense Robert McNamara, 1968
The Department of Defense has a four-decade history of attempting to gain
efficiency and reduce costs by adopting practices that have succeeded in industry, and
regionalization is one of the latest efforts toward that end. Few in the Navy disagree with
the stated intent of regionalization. Greater efficiency, reduced cost, and enhanced
service, with reduced infrastructure, would clearly benefit fleet units, members of the
armed forces, and taxpayers. However, if regionalization is not to be another management
fad, going the way of Total Quality Leadership, Management by Objectives, Zero-Based
Budgeting, and Management by Walking Around, there must be clear measurement
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criteria that will either show demonstrable savings or improvement, or identify the need
for corrective action.
Most Navy personnel interviewed for this study were skeptical, if not incredulous,
regarding the need for criteria to evaluate regionalization. The consensus was that if
regionalization saves money, it is a success. If it doesn't, it is a failure. However,
demonstrating "savings" is not enough. Unlike business, the Navy receives its revenue
from Congress. A cut of $8 billion will result in an $8 billion reduction in expenditures.
This reduction in expenditures must not be confused with savings. The key to evaluating
regionalization lies in the degree to which the Navy is able to absorb budget cuts while
preserving military readiness and levels of service.
Adoption of best business practices is the fundamental element in implementation
of regionalization. It is mentioned in the CNO order to regionalize, CINCPACFLT
guidance, and the mission statements of the regions themselves. The key to evaluating
regionalization lies not in whether Navy activities spend less money than before
regionalization; they will. The key to evaluation is the degree to which regions adopt best
business practices, offsetting the deleterious effects of budget cuts. This chapter discusses
current best business practices in industry and government literature as they relate to
regionalization.
In 1997, L.R. Jones and Fred Thompson developed a framework for classifying
and integrating often used concepts in current business literature [Ref 39]. Their five
categories, summarized in Figure 5-1, provide a framework from which to view business
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THE FIVE R'S OF THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
1. Restructuring:
• Identify the organization's core competencies.
• Cut everything out of the organization that does not add value to its services - especially rules that inhibit
performance.
• Contract everything out of the organization that is not a core competency.
• Tools: TQM value-chain analysis, activity based costing (ABC)
2. Reengineering:
Start over rather than trying to "fix" existing processes with "band aid" solutions.
Put the computer and other information technologies at the center of the operation.
Build from the ground up rather than from the top down.
Base organizational design on processes rather than functions and positions on the organizational chart.
Focus on improving service quality, reduced cycle time, and costs.
Tools: modern databases, expert systems, and information technologies; teaming, benchmarking cycle-time
burdening.
3. Reinvention:
• Develop a planning process.
• Establish a service/market strategy.
• Move the organization toward new service delivery modes and markets.
• Tools: strategic planning, market research, target costing, networks and alliances.
4. Realignment:
• Align the organization's administrative and responsibility structures with its market and service delivery strategy.
• Align the organization's control/reward structure with its administrative and responsibility structures
• Put mission centers first; functionally specialized activities, such as personnel or finance management, are core
missions only for organizations that supply those services, such as temporary personnel agencies or financial
institutions; if units do not perform core missions, they should be treated as support centers.
• Tools: Performance-Based Organizations, multi-divisional structures, lean production, responsibility budgeting and
accounting, transfer prices, high-powered incentives.
5. Rethinking:
• Speed up the observation, orientation, decide, act cycle - both to improve performance and to learn faster.
• Empower front line workers to evaluate service performance and provide feedback on service delivery and strategy.
• Build a learning, adapting organization.
• Tools: decentralization, flexible controls, working capital, quick and dirty analysis, learning models.
Figure 5-1, The Five R's Of The New Public Management [Ref. 39]
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initiatives in public organizations. The five R's encompass many of the best business
practices reviewed in this research, and provide the foundation of the criteria.
B. EVALUATION CRITERIA
Vision must come from the top.
The general nature of the regionalization order and the lack of coherent direction
for regional and operational personnel noted in Chapter IV are inconsistent with the
innovative nature of best business practices. The vision for regionalization must be
articulated both qualitatively and quantitatively, providing clear objectives, means of
measuring progress, and continued encouragement for the process to maintain momentum
[Ref. 20]. According to Hamel and Prahalad, "We don't believe that any company can get
along without a well-articulated point of view about tomorrow's opportunities and
challenges" [Ref. 17].
An effective vision should include mission, core competency, basis of
differentiation, and the heart ofthe philosophy [Ref. 57]. However, a vision statement
alone is just well crafted rhetoric. Leadership at the OPNAV level must embrace the
vision. Wayne Bragg, Controller for Sikorsky Aircraft, observes, ". . only an overriding
vision, a common purpose and management support for empowered, boundaryless teams
can overcome the management infrastructure so deeply embedded in organizational silos.
This vision should clarify direction, outline the path to success and call for
collaboration.
.
." [Ref. 43]. Specific goals must be set in strategic terms. "Do better" is
not adequate direction. Thus far in the process, Claimants and COs resisting
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regionalization represent a major obstacle to success. The OPNAV DCNOs must
articulating regionalization vision to achieve potential benefits.
Leadership must be committed to the process.
President Lyndon B. Johnson once remarked, "The best way to kill a new idea is
to put it in an old-line agency" [Ref. 2]. A lack of enthusiasm on the part of some Navy
claimants has been identified as an obstacle to implementation of regionalization.
Hammer and Stanton state, 'Tassionate, committed, engaged executive leadership
is an absolute prerequisite for reengineering" [Ref. 20]. Committed leadership is the key
to fundamental organizational change, and while the commitment ofRegional
Commanders and CENCPACFLT is crucial to regionalization, it is not enough. Navy
leadership must have the willingness, and the power, to induce all claimants to participate
in the process, to attempt to change other Navy bureaucracies that inhibit infrastructure
reduction, and to forestall efforts to reap short-term benefits at the expense of long-run
efficiency. The regionalization leader should be, "... a senior executive with enough clout
to cause an organization to turn itself inside out and upside down and to persuade people
to accept the radical disruptions. . ."[Ref. 19]. Not only must leadership be committed to
the process, but they must continuously demonstrate that commitment.
Customers must be identified.
A huge volume of best practice literature has been published in the 1990s. It is
clear that the large, bureaucratic organizational structures developed in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries in many instances are no longer adequate to permit adaptation in
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today's rapidly changing environment. The literature has a common theme: methods are
being developed to provide better value to customers, faster, and at lower costs. Whether
the goal is increased profitability or market share for a corporation, or increased
capabilities at the same or reduced cost for a military organization, the customer must be
the focus for any of these initiatives to be effective.
Customer identification is a difficult task in mission-driven organizations [Ref. 20].
Nevertheless, to apply best business practices, operating core customers must be separated
from the service activities that support them. Regions cannot behave as an end unto
themselves. Instead, they must act as a means unto an end; i.e., to the support of their
customers.
Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad describe the goal of reengineering as, "...to root
out needless work and get every process in the company pointed in the direction of
customer satisfaction, reduced cycle time, and total quality"[Ref. 17]. Jones and
Thompson define restructuring as, "...cutting everything from the organization that does
not contribute value to the service or product delivered to customers"[Ref 39]. For
regionalization to succeed, regions must identify their customers and then strive to meet
their expectations while reducing costs.
The concerns expressed in Chapter IV indicate that regions have not yet begun to
view tenants and operational commands as customers. The view of customers as a drain
on regional resources must be abandoned. For regionalization to succeed, provision of
service to the customer must be the central concern of the regional staff.
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Customer needs must have top priority.
After identifying the customer and the service provider, regions must meet the
priorities and needs of their customer base. Each regional staff has developed some
customer feedback mechanism, but the concerns voiced by regional customers noted in
Chapter IV indicate a need for improvement. Refusal to fund Squadron Ombudsman
expenses, for example, had a very small impact on the regional budget. However, the
service was deemed a critical quality of life issue by the TYCOM.
In Intelligent Enterprise, James Brian Quinn explains the need to consider
customer desires by relaying the following from Mr. Edward Hanway, President of
CIGNA Worldwide:
In developing our quality metrics, we undertook a significant number of
customer and broker interviews, some of which told us things we didn't
know before - like people don't really care how fast we settle a claim, as
long as there is somebody on the other end of the phone when they call up
who can tell them exactly where their claim is in the process. That was
much more important to them than how fast they got the check.
Heretofore, we would have always said, "If we can improve from two
weeks to four days, we will have done a great job. Unfortunately, the
customer really didn't value that as highly as we thought they did [Ref. 57].
In public organizations the customer seldom pays for services. Revenues
are derived from annual appropriations and often are not related to the quality of
service provided. Customer demand for service is virtually unlimited, while the
ability to supply services is limited by parties outside the region. By knowing
customer preferences, regions will be better able to consider priorities when
imposing budget cuts and limiting negative impact on customers.
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By developing customer performance metrics up-front regions can avoid the pitfall
of finding the most efficient, fastest, cost-effective way of doing the wrong things. They
must not neglect or eliminate services that their customers deem critical. These metrics
should be used to define and maintain core competencies, and to capture the non-
monetary costs associated with increased distance from services, and changing service
standards.
Core competencies must be defined.
A core competence is a set of skills and technology that enables organizations to
provide value to their customers [Ref. 57]. Defining core competencies answers the
questions, "What business are we really in? What business should we be in?"
Definition of core competencies of major claimants is central to the success of
regionalization. Recall in Chapter IV the example of the NAVFAC and NAVSUP
activities maintaining duplicate contracting capabilities because both consider contracting
to be an organizational core competency. SPAWAR, NAVSEA, and NAVATR also
consider contracting as a core competency. A first step in the infrastructure reduction is
the identification of all of these myriad functions that Navy commands consider central to
achieving their mission.
At the macro level, functions are examined to determine those that provide value
to Navy customers and those that could be better provided by other organizations.
Examples of the types of questions that should be asked are: "Is the Navy really in the
nuclear reactor business? Is submarine reactor repair something we do better than anyone
else?" Here, the answer seems to be clearly yes. "Is the Navy in the family health care
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business? Do we provide dependent health care better and more cost effectively than
anyone else?" The answers here are less clear.
Non-core competencies should be outsourced. Core competencies should not
be outsourced.
For regions to reach "most efficient organization," claimant competencies, once
identified, must be combined across the region. In some cases duplicate competencies may
remain. For example, contracting for acquisition of technology intensive space systems by
SPAWAR is a vastly different process than contracting for cleaning supplies by a FISC.
However, contracting for purchase of sink faucets by a PWC and contracting for sink
faucets by a FISC are identical competencies and should be combined. For claimants to
achieve this level of cooperation, the vision, leadership, and stovepipe criteria developed
here must be satisfied.
For all the competencies identified, value chain analysis should be performed. This
process divides activities, or processes, into primary and support activities and determines
which provide value to the customer and which do not [Ref. 15]. Non-value adding and
non-core activities should then be outsourced to commercial enterprises that do perform
them as core activities. In The Age of Unreason, Charles Handy notes: "Organizations
have realized that, while it may be convenient to have everyone around all the time, having
all of your workforce's time at your command is an extravagant way of marshalling the
necessary resources. It is cheaper to keep them outside the organization, employed by
themselves or by specialist contractors, and to buy their services when you need them"
[Ref. 21].
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As stated in Chapter II, competitive sourcing initiatives are separate from
regionalization and will likely be mandated by DoD regardless of regionalization initiatives
[Ref. 1]. However, to ensure that appropriate activities are outsourced, value chain
analysis is required. By consolidating competencies across regional lines prior to A-76
outsourcing studies, the number of studies required by individual activities will be limited,
and contract scope and value can be more accurately defined. Also, by identifying core
competencies and value-added activities, the Navy can avoid outsourcing critical activities
that may compromise long term customer support [Ref. 15]. As Hammel and Prahalad
point out, "...companies insensitive to the issue of core competence may unwittingly
relinquish valuable skills. . ." [Ref. 15].
Costs must be clearly identified.
Activity-based costing (ABC) is a method of assigning direct and indirect costs to
products, services, or outcomes. Indirect costs are usually associated with the term
"overhead" in industry. In military organizations, much of the cost of "infrastructure" fits
the definition of overhead. To reduce the costs of services, products, or processes it is
necessary to understand the nature and distribution of costs for these functions.
Military organizations have traditionally treated most costs as "mission funded,"
meaning that costs were captured at the macro level, assigned on a command basis, and
were rarely compared to develop standards or targets. A notable exception is the Navy
Working Capital Fund that operates by "selling" services to mission funded customers.
Because costs must be passed on to customers, they are assessed in a more scientific way.
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Recently, U.S. Army activities have had success with experimental ABC efforts, and they
are planning to implement ABC on a wider scale [Ref. 17].
If reducing costs is a primary goal of infrastructure reduction, then knowing what
drives costs is the foundation for reducing them. ABC can help determine what products
and services to provide, which customers to serve, lowest-cost product or process design,
and high cost products or services [Ref. 40]. After BOS competencies are established,
their costs must be ascertained to develop costing targets and product priorities.
Costs should not be passed off to customers or hidden in other budgets.
Many customers of regions expressed concern that they were being forced to fund
traditional support functions using flying hour, support and equipage, and other
operational funds [Ref. 40]. CINCPACFLT personnel pointed out that it was all
CINCPACFLT 0&M,N money and didn't really matter "in the big picture" [Ref. 26].
There are two problems inherent in this tendency. First, the support structure is
funded at the expense of the operating core. The most basic Navy core competencies of
conducting training, exercises in support of warfighting capability, and sustained combat
operations, are being decremented. Second, Navy revenue does not come from external
customers. The budget process is incremental. As Aaron Wildavsky observes, "The
largest determining factor of this year's budget is last year's" [Ref. 61]. Passing BOS
costs to other budget lines may make regionalization seem more successful in the short
run, but, by not capturing true costs and showing pain, future budgets will not be adjusted
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to correct shortfalls. If anything, they may be further reduced in anticipation of additional
"savings."
Benchmarking should be performed to establish cost and service objectives.
Benchmarking is defined by the International Benchmarking Clearinghouse as ". . a
systematic and continuous measurement process; a process of continuously comparing and
measuring an organization's business process (products, services and practices) against
business leaders anywhere in the world to gain information which help(s) the organization
take actions to improve its performance"[Ref 41]. Benchmarking provides process data,
decision-making criteria, and a process for improvement [Ref. 41]. Benchmarking
provides the link between government organizations and the best business practices they
intend to adopt. Benchmarking is not a new or radical concept in the Department of the
Navy. The Department of the Navy Benchmarking Handbook: A Systems View provides
the methodology to be used when benchmarking [Ref. 41]. This is summarized in Figure
5-2. If using best business practices is an assumption in the regionalization concept,
then benchmarking must be an integral element if regionalization is to succeed. After
process costs are determined, benchmarks must be used to develop cost goals, service
standards, and performance objectives for Program Managers.
Manpower costs must be reduced.
For regionalization to be effective, increases in customer service must be
accompanied by significant reductions in manpower costs. Reductions must be dramatic.
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The two-percent savings estimated in the Pearl Harbor Region does not justify the
organizational upheaval associated with regionalization [Ref. 22]. When Ford Motor
Company set out to restructure its North American accounts payable department, it hoped
to achieve a twenty-percent workforce reduction through automation. Through the
process of reengineering, it was ultimately able to achieve a seventyfive percent reduction
[Ref. 19]. Of course, three of four people employed in the accounts payable process were
forced to seek other employment. One of the central goals, and arguably the principal
goal, of regionalization is cost avoidance. To achieve it, there must be a demonstrable
reduction in military and civilian end strength. Eliminating a few middle management
positions through attrition is not adequate payoff for the massive effort of regionalization.
Roles of CO/ACOS/PM must be clearly defined.
The conflict between the existing bureaucratic structure and the flatter, more
decentralized structure appropriate for regionalization is acutely manifested in the still ill
defined roles of Commanding Officers, Assistant Chiefs of Staff, and Program Managers.
The interests of the installation or command, of which a PM is the CO, may directly
conflict with the interests of the customers of the process that he owns. As CO, an
individual is expected to be the advocate for his or her base, activity, or command. As
PM, he or she is responsible for distribution of resources to other bases, activities, and
tenants. Much of the concern expressed in Chapter IV over personality based decision
making and "shell games" with billets results from this conflict. The conflict itself arises
from attempting to operate simultaneously in two very different organizational structures.
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86
This desire to evolve from the old organizational structure to the new in small
incremental steps is understandable, especially given that the Navy has a 230-year history
steeped in tradition and the culture of command at sea. However, the best business
practices upon which the regionalization concept is based are not evolutionary changes
best carried out in small cautious steps [Ref. 19]. To utilize these practices, process
owners must understand their roles and responsibilities, measures of effectiveness, and
incentives. These must be consistent with regionalization goals.
After roles are established, personnel must be trained to fill new roles. A senior
officer who has spent a career as a line operator is a generalist. The skills of a generalist
were required to coordinate the self-sufficient hierarchy of a base organized along
traditional lines. In order to provide a specific service to a wide range of customers,
COs/PMs must acquire specialized knowledge ofthe process they are responsible for.
Regional positions must be based on functions, not personalities.
A key element of reengineering is a focus on processes instead of tasks, jobs,
people, or organizational charts [Ref. 19]. Hammer and Champy define a business process
as ". ..a collection of activities that takes one or more kinds of input and creates an output
that is of value to the customer" [Ref. 19]. This definition fits well with the regional
Program Manager concept, because PMs can be empowered to control all of the inputs
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and processes of their program to serve customers. In the reengineering literature they
are "process owners" [Ref. 19].
Because regionalization was approached differently by different regions and
activities, processes are not standardized. Processes in some regions were structured
around the skills and beliefs of position incumbents at the time of regional studies [Ref.
31]. As these people leave their positions due to periodic military rotation, civilian
transfers, and retirements, processes may need to be redefined. Processes must be refined
and improved constantly, but they cannot be constantly reengineered. Personnel must be
assigned to processes, not processes assigned to personnel.
Stovepipes, Flagpoles, and Rice Bowls are constraints that must be overcome.
Personnel involved in the implementation of regionalization cited stovepipes,
flagpoles, and rice bowls as the greatest impediments to success. Stovepipes, flagpoles,
and rice bowls are firmly embedded in Navy culture, but they are by no means unique to
the military. Commands are managed as if they are entirely independent entities within
their individual "stovepipes" and insulated from influence except from above and below.
The "flagpole" represents the identity of the stand-alone command; the "rice bowl" a
symbol of jealously guarded resources or self-interest. These features of a bureaucratic
hierarchy, commonly referred to as "silos" in industry, result from the fragmentation of
processes [Ref. 19]. People working in these silos focus their attention inward toward the
organization and up the chain of command, but not outward to other organizations or the
customers[Ref 19].
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A military organization may never function as a "boundaryless corporation," where
they ". . knock down the walls that separate us from each other on the inside and from our
key constituencies on the outside"[Ref. 15]. Nevertheless, the success or failure of
regionalization depends in large part on the ability to move Navy infrastructure in that
direction. The trend of successful businesses toward flatter, decentralized organizations is
the result of the failure of traditional bureaucratic structures to meet the demands of
today's information rich, knowledge-based economy where customer demand is often
widely dispersed [Ref. 39]. For regionalization to succeed, Navy support structures need
to be flattened, shifting the focus from self-sufficient, insulated management of
installations to management ofprograms or processes that serve the operating core.
For this to occur, base Commanding Officers and support claimants will have to
surrender power, prestige, and control of resources in the interests of efficiency. To
achieve such changes, incentives must change.
Incentives must match strategy.
An incentive structure based on personal power, prestige from control of
resources, and promotion based on competition with individuals assigned to similar
positions is not appropriate for regionalized activities. Performance evaluations,
promotion, and rewards for CO's/ACOSs/PMs must instead be tied to the success or
failure of the processes they manage. The establishment of benchmarks, standards of
service, and performance metrics for processes provide the basis for new incentives.
Process owners must be evaluated and promoted based on their ability to meet these
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standards, and to satisfy customers. This shift in incentives and rewards will provide a
primary tool in shaping the values and beliefs of regional personnel [Ref. 19].
Rotation of personnel should be reduced during implementation.
Because of routine military job rotation and retirement, key personnel have already
have departed each of the three regions studied. In some cases this has been
advantageous, supplying personnel with fresh insights, new ideas, and a better
understanding of business practices. In other cases, though, progress has been sacrificed
as a result of these rotations. Jones and Thompson point out that stability of leadership
and the workforce is important when implementing change [Ref. 39]. They note,
"Training won't pay off for the organization if the employees that are trained leave (or
even worse, if management moves them willy-nilly around the organization" [Ref. 39]. A
leader approaching retirement may likely approach the complex and demanding task of
regionalization unenthusiastically [Ref. 19].
A conscious effort should be made to keep key personnel in place until regional
structures are functioning in MEO, standards of service are in place, and outsourcing
studies are complete. This is a similar approach to that used to provide stability for key
personnel in DoD acquisition programs.
Services should be standardized.
Absence of standard services was a concern of regional personnel, TYCOMs,
tenants, and CINCPAFLT. Because of differing missions and geography, some flexibility
is necessary in defining services, but a majority of services can be standardized. Until
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standard services are defined, different regions will allocate resources differently and
operating units will be unable to anticipate requirements when moving from region to
region. TYCOMs and Regions will be forced to withhold funds for contingencies resulting
from the unexpected refusal of a service, or the unexpected demand for service. TYCOM
personnel will waste time and energy negotiating with three sets of up to eighteen
Program Managers for desired services. Tenants will be forced to address grievances
formally, using their major claimant chain of command, elevating minor disagreements to
flag level decision-makers.
After standard services are defined, then Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) can be
implemented between regions and their customers, as directed by OPNAV regionalization
implementation orders. MOAs will solve the majority of these problems, but services
must be standardized before MOAs can be established.
Rules should be changed to allow the application of best business practices.
Many potential benefits of regionalization cannot be realized because regulations
imposed by other activities within the DoD and the Navy are not compatible with best
practices. One example is the requirement to have multiple Operating Budget (OB)
holders in the Southwest Region because activities on the Oxnard Plain are serviced by a
different DFAS OPLOC than those in San Diego County. Another example is the
inflexibility to move or dismiss personnel caused by HRO requirements.
In cases where these and similar rules are the result of bureaucratic regulation and
not federal law, Navy leadership must assist regions in amending, abolishing, or waiving
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them. The flattened, cooperative structure should not be inhibited from achieving
efficiency by the larger bureaucracy in which it resides.
Initial investment is required to reap the long-term benefits of
regionalization.
The use of enabling technologies is a central feature of business reform [Ref. 19].
Ford's dramatic success in the accounts payable division would not have been possible
without the "essential enabler" of information technology [Ref. 19]. The principle of
enabling technology is that it must be used not just to make existing processes marginally
more efficient, but exploited to allow new processes for performing core competencies.
The PACNORWEST region provides an example of the need for investment in
enabling technology in regional implementation. The geographical makeup of the region
discussed in Chapter III is not conducive to the "collegia!" atmosphere the regional
commander is attempting to sustain. It is difficult for the Board of Directors to meet face
to face, and the time involved in traversing the Puget Sound by ferry or bridge requires a
whole day be devoted by some of the principals. This limits organizational flexibility and
responsiveness. By investing in teleconferencing facilities, the board could meet as often
as necessary throughout the implementation process, with little prior planning, and less
interruption of daily routines.
Investment is also required in education and training [Ref. 39]. As new processes
emerge and new cultures and relationships evolve, leaders, staff members, and storefront
personnel must be trained to operate the processes effectively, breaking the bureaucratic
syndrome of "business as usual."
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Current Navy budget levels do not support investment in infrastructure in support
of regionalization. Budgets have already been decremented in anticipation of savings. For
regionalization to succeed, this trend must be reversed and investments must be made as
processes are defined and requirements identified. Failing to invest to improve future
service quality is ". . penny wise and dollar foolish" [Ref. 39].
Lessons from regional efforts should be compiled, shared, and applied.
Regionalization of the San Diego area was intended as a pilot program. A greater
investment oftime and resources was possible there than in other regions. As a result, the
region has already solved many problems and addressed many concerns still faced in the
other two regions. It was frustrating to discover during the course of this research that
the other regions struggle with similar problems without the benefit of San Diego's
experience, essentially "reinventing the wheel."
Regional Commanders' Conferences have been conducted throughout
regionalization implementation, and they have, as noted in Chapter III, been effective in
"cross-pollinating" regions. Informal alliances are being developed between personnel of
different regions as well, but this is not an adequate means of promoting organizational
learning [Ref. 39]. Shared databases must be developed that include process descriptions,
activity based costs, benchmarks, levels of service, successes, and failures. This level of
cooperation is necessary to accelerate learning and promote standardization across
regions.
93
There can be no end state. Regions must continually strive for improvement
in processes, products, and customer support.
Quinn notes that over half ofthe companies listed on Fortune 's Top 100 list do not
remain there a decade later [Ref. 57]. It is not enough to break apart shore
infrastructures, start providing services along regional lines, and move on to other
challenges. Regions should continuously seek innovation and share information across
functions, claimants, and regions. They must strive to become "learning, adapting
organizations" Ref. 39],
The Hawaii Region provides an excellent example of this criterion. Not satisfied
with savings through manpower reduction, they are exploring the previously unconsidered
possibility of consolidation of not only functions, but locations. The savings realized from
tearing down buildings and avoiding maintenance and utility costs may rival those
achieved by manpower reductions [Ref. 32].
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The criteria developed in this chapter provide specific means to judge the
effectiveness of regionalization. Meeting these criteria will admittedly entail a great deal
of effort and commitment. If applying world-class business practices to military
organizations was easy, Robert McNamara would have succeeded in his effort of 1962.
However, as the Navy is forced into ever-fiercer competition with entitlement and other
programs for Congressional funding and with the private sector for skilled labor, we must
adopt more efficient means of operating if we are to reduce the cost for maintaining
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military readiness. Claimant consolidation, regionalization, and commercial outsourcing, if
done properly, may provide part of the means to meet this challenge.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The budgetary constraints imposed on the Department of Defense today, combined
with increasing competition for labor from the private sector, indicate the need for change.
The Navy can no longer continue to, "do what we've always done" and require people to
do, "more with less." As Hamal and Prahalad note, "We've reached the limits of
incrementalism. Squeezing another penny out of costs, getting a product to market a few
weeks earlier, responding to customer inquiries a little bit faster, ratcheting quality up one
more notch, capturing another point of market share, tweaking the organizational one
additional time - these are the obsessions of managers today. But pursuing incremental
advantage while rivals are fundamentally reinventing the industrial landscape is akin to
fiddling while Rome burns" [Ref. 17].
Navy support budgets will be reduced by $8 billion over the next five years
through the POM process. Any portion of this amount not reduced from support budgets
must be taken largely from modernization accounts. There is only a slight possibility of
reprieve from this budget cut. Reductions in force modernization and canceling or
reducing procurement programs have ominous implications for future defense capability.
Therefore, the Navy has elected to attack the $8 billion wedge through a multi-phase
process, ofwhich regionalization is a major component.
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The application of best business practices has been identified as an enabling
condition for regionalization throughout the development and implementation of the
concept. This study confirms that many opportunities are provided in best business
initiatives that may result in savings for Navy shore installations. Best business practices
must be developed and implemented as part of regionalization for projected savings to
materialize. The preceding chapter identified some of these opportunities, in the form of
evaluative criteria, and identified particular aspects of regionalization to which they can be
applied.
The tools the Navy has chosen to use in infrastructure reduction are appropriate,
but they require a total commitment to the concept. If regionalization is to succeed, the
benefits to the customers and the Navy must be clearly demonstrated and articulated, and
Navy leadership must demonstrate a clear commitment. Otherwise, the bureaucracy that
has served the Navy for so long will continue to resist sweeping changes, resulting in little
more than a shuffling of lines on the organizational chart, changes in titles, and marginal
savings. The consequence of achieving only marginal savings portends more serious
infrastructure reductions in the future or even more drastic constraints on modernization
efforts.
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What criteria should be used to evaluate regionalization efforts in the
Navy9
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Twenty criteria have been developed by synthesizing regionalization goals and
current best business practice literature. These criteria are presented in Chapter V,
Section B.
2. What regionalization concepts have been applied in creating the three
West Coast regions?
The regions were all created following the Chief of Naval Operations' four guiding
principles: no tenant should do what a host command can do, no host should do what a
regional complex can do, no regional complex should do what the surrounding community
can do more cost effectively, and the number of host commands and tenants providing
services should be reduced to the minimum. The three regions share these common goals,
but different organizational structures and business practices were employed in the
establishment of each region. Chapters II and ITI contain detailed analysis of regional
concepts and structures.
3. What measurement tools and data are available to evaluate the fiscal
impacts of regionalization efforts?
Tools available to evaluate the effects of regionalization include value-chain
analysis, activity-based costing, information technology, benchmarking, strategic planning,
target costing, incentives, and reengineering. See Chapter V sections A and B for detailed
explanation.
4. Which of these tools can be effectively applied to Navy activities?
All of these tools can be applied to various aspects of regionalization, as explained
in Chapter V, Section B.
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5. What further research will be necessary to apply these tools and evaluate
Navy regionalization?
Further studies are necessary in the areas of standard services, baseline
development, Activity Based Costing (ABC), benchmarking, and application of the criteria
developed in Chapter V to evaluate the effects of regionalization. These are discussed in
section D of this chapter.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
If regionalization is to be more than another minor modification of Navy
organization charts in response to budget threats, the criteria developed in Chapter V must
be applied consistently and vigorously throughout the Navy infrastructure. Failure to do
so may result in continued customer dissatisfaction, perpetuation of stove-piped
organizations, unnecessarily reduced military capability, and operational readiness, and
reduced quality of life. By establishing uniform standards of service, cost objectives, and
performance measures and then applying them, operational customers of regions might
have less need to supplement BOS support by using operating budgets. By identifying and
applying these performance criteria and best business practices, and through the other
study provided below, regions may be continuously improved.
A strong caution is required, however. Restructuring of this kind does not yield
short-term savings. The steps of the "Five R's" may require five to ten years to fully
implement [Ref 39]. Acceleration of regionalization and outsourcing, while failing to
invest in technology, and reduction of budgets now in anticipation of savings later may
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render these efforts moot The Navy will continue to support its operating units, but
savings will not materialize, and budget reductions are likely to result in reduced levels of
service and reduced military readiness in the longer-term.
D. SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES
1. Standard Services
Using the Core Business model as a template, develop a comprehensive definition
of those services that should be included under the Base Operating Support category.
Research should include opinions of operational forces and tenants to ensure that service
categories reflect customer expectations.
2. Develop Baselines
Prior to completing further regionalization actions and commercial outsourcing
initiatives, identify and compile cost baselines for activities that comprise Navy regions.
The information base should include aggregate budgets, manpower costs, civilian end-
strength and military manning levels, and real property maintenance costs incurred by
claimants prior to ICC.
3. Activity Based Costing
Develop Activity Based Costing (ABC) models for services. Determine the
appropriate allocation of overhead costs to processes and products.
4. Benchmarking
Establish benchmarks for processes. Interface with industry and public sector
leaders who have successfully reengineered structures and processes to establish
101
benchmarks. Codify performance metrics. Identify opportunities to drive costs to
benchmark levels.
5. Analysis of Regionalization
Using the criteria identified in Chapter V and the results of the four research
projects above, evaluate the actual impact of regionalization in terms of changes in costs,
level and quality of service and other effects on the operating and support infrastructures
of the Navy.
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